Partial

RFC 8221 - Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 8221, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways100.0%16 of 16 gated MUSTs

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

Partial proof; remaining gap0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

scoped tests exist; the remaining obligation is unmet or unproven, with zero whole-requirement credit

No test at all0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break100.0%32 of 32 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs16of 19 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 16 gated MUSTs

an obligation that does not bind Ze. A {not-applicable} annotation says it never bound; a {feature-declined} annotation says its condition is an optional feature Ze does not offer, and quotes the RFC sentence that makes it optional. Scope, not coverage: it stays in the denominator every share on this page is taken over

Not applicable0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze, so no test is owed for it. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Met below Ze0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

a {lower-layer} annotation says a layer under Ze performs the behavior, on state Ze installs into that layer, and names the producer that installs it. The obligation binds Ze and is met; Ze proves none of it, because its own boundary carries no value the behavior reads

Optional feature declined0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

a {feature-declined} annotation says the obligation is conditional on a feature the RFC makes optional and Ze does not offer, and it quotes the sentence that makes it optional. The condition is false, so nothing is owed and nothing is missing. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Linux cannot do this0.0%0 of 16 gated MUSTs

Linux cannot provide the primitive this requirement needs. The obligation still binds Ze and remains unmet; it stays in every denominator and earns no proof credit

The 9 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 16 gated MUSTs: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
Partial proof; remaining gap	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a tested clause cannot prove the whole requirement
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Not applicable	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Met below Ze	neutral	no color: an obligation met below Ze is neither a test Ze wrote nor work Ze owes, and the two green shares above are what says how much Ze proves itself
Optional feature declined	neutral	no color: an obligation whose condition Ze never meets is neither an achievement nor a failure. The absent FEATURE is disclosed on the RFC's own status row, as an implementation gap a later scope decision can revisit
Linux cannot do this	neutral	neutral at every value: an evidenced platform limit is neither a proof nor a scope exemption
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Partial
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	19
Gated MUST-level	16
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	0
Declared gaps a test demonstrates	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	32
Tagged units	32
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	32
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc8221.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc8221.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc8221.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: ESP and AH algorithm requirements: sixteen MUST-level rows, every one classified and none a gap. ze's ESP registries (internal/component/ike/crypto/transform.go encryptionRegistry, espOnlyEncryptionRegistry, integrityRegistry, espOnlyIntegrityRegistry) offer ENCR_NULL, ENCR_AES_CBC and ENCR_AES_GCM_16 with 128- and 256-bit keys, AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 and AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, and none of the MUST NOT algorithms. Every row owes a tagged test. The IPCOMP_OUI row is conditional on compression, which this RFC leaves optional and ze does not offer (feature-out-of-scope in the extraction).

What the public ledger says

Status: Partial

What the ledger says is covered:

ESP encryption ENCR_NULL, ENCR_AES_CBC, ENCR_AES_GCM_16, ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 and ENCR_3DES
integrity AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, 384_192 and 512_256. No DES, Blowfish, 3IDEA, MD5 or DES-MAC.

What the ledger says remains:

ENCR_AES_CCM_8 for ESP, AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, the GMAC algorithms and IPComp are not offered. Requirement tests are owed for every MUST-level row.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	16	one part of the gated population
Annotated (including scoped evidence)	0	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Partial proof; remaining gap (subset of annotated; zero whole-requirement credit)	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Derived from other rows	0	outside the gated population: each asserts nothing and derives its state from the rows it names, which the parts above already count
Gated MUST-level requirements	16	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (16): RFC8221-3-1, RFC8221-4-1, RFC8221-5-1, RFC8221-5-2, RFC8221-5-3, RFC8221-5-4, RFC8221-5-5, RFC8221-5-6, RFC8221-5-7, RFC8221-5-8, RFC8221-6-1, RFC8221-6-2, RFC8221-6-3, RFC8221-6-4, RFC8221-6-5, RFC8221-6-6

Attainable ceiling

Mandatory ceiling: 16 of 16 (100.0%). Optional ceiling: 3 of 3 (100.0%). Every RFC shown with measured rows can reach 100% under current classifications. Lowest mandatory ceiling: rfc8221 16 of 16 (100.0%). Lowest optional ceiling: rfc8221 3 of 3 (100.0%). Ceilings describe current classifications, not an immutable Linux maximum. Not-applicable and feature-declined classifications can be revisited. Every gap remains work Ze owes.

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC8221-3-1`	If manual keying is used regardless, Counter Mode algorithms such as ENCR_AES_CTR, ENCR_AES_CCM, ENCR_AES_GCM, and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 MUST NOT be used, as it is incompatible with a secure and persistent handling of the counter (as explained in the Security Considerations section of [RFC3686]). (§3)
	MUST NOT	3	positive`unit/verifyTestManualKeyingRefusesCounterModeCiphers` negative`unit/verifyTestManualKeyingRefusesCounterModeCiphers`
`RFC8221-4-1`	Encryption without authentication is not effective and MUST NOT be used. (§4)
	MUST NOT	4	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated`
`RFC8221-5-1`	For that purpose, the requirement level for 128-bit keys and 256-bit keys is MUST (when applicable). (§5)
	MUST	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall`
`RFC8221-5-2`	These algorithms were not mentioned in [RFC7321], and this document clarifies that such algorithms MUST NOT be implemented for IPsec communications. (§5)
	MUST NOT	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers`
`RFC8221-5-3`	As a result, these algorithms MUST NOT be implemented. (§5)
	MUST NOT	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers`
`RFC8221-5-4`	Various ciphers that are older, not well tested, and never widely implemented have been changed to MUST NOT. (§5)
	MUST NOT	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers`
`RFC8221-5-5`	ENCR_BLOWFISH has been downgraded to MUST NOT as it has been deprecated for years by TWOFISH, which is not standardized for ESP and therefore not listed in this document. (§5)
	MUST NOT	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesForbiddenCiphers`
`RFC8221-5-6`	ENCR_NULL status was set to MUST in [RFC7321] and remains a MUST to enable the use of ESP with only authentication, which is preferred over AH due to NAT traversal. (§5)
	MUST	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall`
`RFC8221-5-7`	ENCR_AES_CBC MUST be implemented in order to enable interoperability between implementations that followed [RFC7321]. (§5)
	MUST	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall`
`RFC8221-5-8`	ENCR_AES_GCM_16 status has been updated from SHOULD+ to MUST in order to favor the use of authenticated encryption and AEAD algorithms. (§5)
	MUST	5	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryCiphersInstall`
`RFC8221-6-1`	AUTH_NONE has been downgraded from MAY in [RFC7321] to MUST NOT. (§6)
	MUST NOT	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated`
`RFC8221-6-2`	In all other cases, AUTH_NONE MUST NOT be selected. (§6)
	MUST NOT	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPEncryptionIsAuthenticated`
`RFC8221-6-3`	As MD5 is known to be vulnerable to collisions, these algorithms MUST NOT be used. (§6)
	MUST NOT	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesMD5AndDESMACIntegrity` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesMD5AndDESMACIntegrity`
`RFC8221-6-4`	AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in [RFC7321] to MUST- as there is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage. (§6)
	MUST	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryIntegrityInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryIntegrityInstall`
`RFC8221-6-5`	As DES is known to be vulnerable, it MUST NOT be used. (§6)
	MUST NOT	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesMD5AndDESMACIntegrity` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPRefusesMD5AndDESMACIntegrity`
`RFC8221-6-6`	AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 MUST be implemented in order to replace AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96. (§6)
	MUST	6	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryIntegrityInstall` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC8221ESPMandatoryIntegrityInstall`
`RFC8221-5-9`	Its status has been set to SHOULD and is expected to become MUST in the long term. (§5)
	SHOULD	5	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC8221-6-7`	AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 SHOULD be implemented as a future replacement of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 or when stronger security is required. (§6)
	SHOULD	6	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC8221-7-1`	As it is not widely deployed, it remains optional and at the MAY level. (§7)
	MAY	7	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

RFC 8221 declares no gap, and every gated MUST it carries has a test bound to it.

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

`RFC8221-3-1`

If manual keying is used regardless, Counter Mode algorithms such as ENCR_AES_CTR, ENCR_AES_CCM, ENCR_AES_GCM, and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 MUST NOT be used, as it is incompatible with a secure and persistent handling of the counter (as explained in the Security Considerations section of [RFC3686]). (§3)