No row in the public ledger

RFC 7427 - Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 7427, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways100.0%2 of 2 binding obligations

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason0.0%0 of 2 binding obligations

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 2 binding obligations

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 2 binding obligations

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 6 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs3of 7 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope1of 3 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below

The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 2 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	No row in the public ledger
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	7
Gated MUST-level	3
Obligations that bind Ze	2
Not applicable, so out of scope	1
Declared gaps	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	6
Tagged units	6
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	0
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc7427.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc7427.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc7427.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: Signature Authentication in IKEv2: three MUST-level requirements. RFC7427-3-4 (Section 3 permits the Digital Signature method only once a SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify has been sent and received by each peer) is tested both polarities: computeX509Auth (internal/component/ike/engine/auth.go) refuses the method on an empty sa.RemoteHashAlgos and emits method 14 once one arrived (TestRFC7427DigitalSignatureNeedsTheNotify, TestAuthX509UsesMethod14), while PSK auth uses method 2 (TestAuthPSKCompute), and ze always sends the notify (buildSignatureHashAlgosNotify). RFC7427-4-1 (Section 4: the signer picks one algorithm the other peer sent) is tested both polarities over selectSignatureAlgorithm and computeX509Auth (TestRFC7427SignatureAlgorithmIsOneThePeerSent, TestRFC7427AuthRefusesAnAlgorithmThePeerDidNotSend). RFC7427-3-1 (ANSI X9.62 hash truncation) is {not-applicable}: ze delegates ECDSA to Go crypto/ecdsa (ecdsa.SignASN1/VerifyASN1), which does the truncation; ze implements none itself. No MUST gap remains gated. docs/features/rfc-status.md carries no RFC 7427 row, which its grandfathering permits and which no change here alters.

What the public ledger says

No row in the public ledger, so its summary declares `| Support | - |` and docs/features/rfc-status.md carries no row for RFC 7427.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	2	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	1	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	3	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (2): RFC7427-4-1, RFC7427-3-4

Annotated instead of tested (1): RFC7427-3-1

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC7427-4-1`	When calculating the digital signature, a peer MUST pick one hash algorithm sent by the other peer (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC7427SignatureAlgorithmIsOneThePeerSent` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC7427AuthRefusesAnAlgorithmThePeerDidNotSend` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC7427SignatureAlgorithmIsOneThePeerSent`
`RFC7427-3-4`	Use the "Digital Signature" authentication method only if a Notify payload of type SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS has been sent and received by each peer (§3)
	MUST	3	positive`unit/verifyTestAuthX509UsesMethod14` positive`unit/verifyTestRFC7427DigitalSignatureNeedsTheNotify` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC7427DigitalSignatureNeedsTheNotify`
`RFC7427-3-1`	Use ANSI X9.62:2005 method for hash truncation when hash is longer than curve order (§3)
	MUST	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {not-applicable}: ze does not implement ECDSA hash truncation itself -- it passes the full digest to Go's crypto/ecdsa (signDigest -> ecdsa.SignASN1, and verifySignature -> ecdsa.VerifyASN1, both in internal/component/ike/engine/auth.go), which performs the FIPS 186-4 / ANSI X9.62 leftmost-bits truncation internally. There is no ze-authored truncation code to gate
`RFC7427-4-2`	Both peers SHOULD include SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify in IKE_SA_INIT (§4)
	SHOULD	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC7427-4-3`	Support SHA-1 as a hash algorithm for backward compatibility (§4)
	SHOULD	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC7427-3-2`	Follow algorithm specification for parameter encoding (preferredPresent vs preferredAbsent) (§3)
	SHOULD	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC7427-3-3`	Implementations MAY compare ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier as binary blob against known values (§3)
	MAY	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC7427-3-1` Use ANSI X9.62:2005 method for hash truncation when hash is longer than curve order (§3)	no test	no test carries this requirement id; annotated {not-applicable}: ze does not implement ECDSA hash truncation itself -- it passes the full digest to Go's crypto/ecdsa (signDigest -> ecdsa.SignASN1, and verifySignature -> ecdsa.VerifyASN1, both in internal/component/ike/engine/auth.go), which performs the FIPS 186-4 / ANSI X9.62 leftmost-bits truncation internally. There is no ze-authored truncation code to gate

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

`RFC7427-4-1`

When calculating the digital signature, a peer MUST pick one hash algorithm sent by the other peer (§4)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestRFC7427AuthRefusesAnAlgorithmThePeerDidNotSend`	unit/verify	unproven
negative	`TestRFC7427SignatureAlgorithmIsOneThePeerSent`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestRFC7427SignatureAlgorithmIsOneThePeerSent`	unit/verify	unproven

`RFC7427-3-4`

Use the "Digital Signature" authentication method only if a Notify payload of type SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS has been sent and received by each peer (§3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestRFC7427DigitalSignatureNeedsTheNotify`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestAuthX509UsesMethod14`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestRFC7427DigitalSignatureNeedsTheNotify`	unit/verify	unproven

`RFC7427-3-1`

Use ANSI X9.62:2005 method for hash truncation when hash is longer than curve order (§3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

No test carries RFC7427-3-1, so no unit is bound to it.

Extraction sign-off

No extraction sign-off exists for RFC 7427, so no reviewer has walked its text sentence by sentence.

Superseded

No document obsoletes RFC 7427, so its obligations are stated where they were written.