Supported

RFC 6286 - Autonomous-System-Wide Unique BGP Identifier for BGP-4

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 6286, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways75.0%3 of 4 gated MUSTs

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break31.2%5 of 16 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs4of 5 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 4 gated MUSTs

an obligation that does not bind Ze. A {not-applicable} annotation says it never bound; a {feature-declined} annotation says its condition is an optional feature Ze does not offer, and quotes the RFC sentence that makes it optional. Scope, not coverage: it stays in the denominator every share on this page is taken over

Not applicable0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze, so no test is owed for it. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Met below Ze0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

a {lower-layer} annotation says a layer under Ze performs the behavior, on state Ze installs into that layer, and names the producer that installs it. The obligation binds Ze and is met; Ze proves none of it, because its own boundary carries no value the behavior reads

Optional feature declined0.0%0 of 4 gated MUSTs

a {feature-declined} annotation says the obligation is conditional on a feature the RFC makes optional and Ze does not offer, and it quotes the sentence that makes it optional. The condition is false, so nothing is owed and nothing is missing. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Negative

what Ze owes

Partial proof; remaining gap25.0%1 of 4 gated MUSTs

scoped tests exist; the remaining obligation is unmet or unproven, with zero whole-requirement credit

Audit verdicts5of 4 gated MUSTs judged

1 weak, wrong or unimplemented, 0 no longer current. Each is named below under its own requirement id

The 8 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 4 gated MUSTs: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
Partial proof; remaining gap	bad	green at zero, RED above it: a tested clause cannot prove the whole requirement
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Not applicable	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Met below Ze	neutral	no color: an obligation met below Ze is neither a test Ze wrote nor work Ze owes, and the two green shares above are what says how much Ze proves itself
Optional feature declined	neutral	no color: an obligation whose condition Ze never meets is neither an achievement nor a failure. The absent FEATURE is disclosed on the RFC's own status row, as an implementation gap a later scope decision can revisit
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	bad	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Supported
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	5
Gated MUST-level	4
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	0
Declared gaps a test demonstrates	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	16
Tagged units	16
Recorded audit verdicts	5
Discrimination records	5
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc6286.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc6286.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc6286.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: Autonomous-System-Wide Unique BGP Identifier for BGP-4: three short protocol revisions to RFC 4271 that ze now implements end to end -- the Section 2.2 reception check on both OPEN rails, the Section 2.1 AS-wide identifier claim (and its operator opt-out), and the Section 2.3 collision tie-break.

What the public ledger says

Status: Supported

What the ledger says is covered

All three protocol revisions. Section 2.1: the local identifier is rejected when zero, on the global leaf and on a per-peer override (parseRouterID, internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go), and AS-wide uniqueness is enforced by default through a claim taken during OPEN validation and released on session teardown (internal/component/bgp/reactor/routerid_unique.go), with bgp/session/allow-shared-router-id as the operator opt-out the lowercase "should" permits. Section 2.2: a received OPEN whose BGP Identifier is zero, or equals ze's own identifier and comes from an internal peer, is answered with OPEN Message Error / Bad BGP Identifier on BOTH receive rails -- normal receive and the connection that won collision resolution (internal/component/bgp/reactor/session_open_validation.go, called from session_handlers.go and session_connection.go)
the same identifier from an external peer is accepted, as Section 2.2 requires. The LOSING connection of a collision is closed before Section 2.2 runs, so it receives Cease / Connection Collision (6/7) rather than Bad BGP Identifier even when its identifier is zero (rejectConnectionCollision, internal/component/bgp/reactor/reactor_connection.go). The connection closes either way and RFC 4271 Section 6.8 does not fix the ordering, but the subcode differs and this row does not claim otherwise. Section 2.3: identical identifiers in a connection collision preserve the connection initiated by the larger AS number (internal/component/bgp/reactor/session.go DetectCollision). Requirements bound per line in rfc/short/rfc6286.md.

What the ledger says remains

Section 2.1: the identifier is the same for every peer only when no peer or group sets session router-id; the global router-id is the default and a peer or group may override it (parsePeerSettings, internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go), an owner-approved deviation from Section 2.1 (owner, 2026-10-13, D4 of the BGP OPEN session RFC defects spec) that is not counted conformant. Section 2.3 applies only where RFC 4271 Section 6.8 collision detection already applies (OpenConfirm): ze does not implement the Section 6.8 OpenSent MAY, tracked under the RFC 4271 row.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	3	one part of the gated population
Annotated (including scoped evidence)	1	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Partial proof; remaining gap (subset of annotated; zero whole-requirement credit)	1	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Derived from other rows	0	outside the gated population: each asserts nothing and derives its state from the rows it names, which the parts above already count
Gated MUST-level requirements	4	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (3): RFC6286-2.2-1, RFC6286-2.2-2, RFC6286-2.3-1

Annotated (including scoped evidence) (1): RFC6286-2.1-1

Partial proof; remaining gap (subset of annotated; zero whole-requirement credit) (1): RFC6286-2.1-1

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC6286-2.1-1`	The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. The value of the BGP Identifier for a BGP speaker is determined on startup and is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer. (Section 2.1)
	MUST	2.1 - Definition of the BGP Identifier	positive`unit/verifyTestParsePeerFromTreeInvalid` positive`unit/verifyTestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC6286NonZeroRouterIDAccepted` {partial}: tested "non-zero integer"; gap "is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer"; owner-approved deviation (spec-bgp-open-session-rfc-defects Q2, owner 2026-10-13: "we should have a global router-id which can be overwritten per peer which is over what the RFC allows"), not counted conformant: the global `router-id` is the default and a peer or group may override it with the `session router-id` leaf, and each OPEN carries its own peer's identifier, so a configured override gives that peer an identifier different from the others'; internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go::parsePeerSettings reads the override. The non-zero clause is enforced: parseRouterID rejects 0.0.0.0 for the global leaf and a per-peer override Scoped evidence: Tests and tag-claim records apply only to Tested; zero whole-requirement credit. partial (the tests enforce only the declared tested scope; the whole requirement remains unmet), fresh. Re-judged 2026-10-14 (independent auditor) after d667673f7e; supersedes the pending rejudge-rfc6286.json. Row is {partial}. Tested: 'non-zero integer'. Gap: 'is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer', an owner-approved deviation (spec-bgp-open-session-rfc-defects Q2, 2026-10-13): the per-peer session router-id override read by Producer internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go::parsePeerSettings gives a peer an identifier different from the others'; not counted conformant. Within Tested: config_test.go::TestParsePeerFromTreeInvalid zero_router_id_rejected requires a peer-level 0.0.0.0 to be refused with the RFC 6286 Section 2.1 error; rfc6286_router_id_test.go::TestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected requires PeersFromTree to refuse a global bgp router-id of 0.0.0.0 with that error and to accept 0.0.0.1, inherited by an override-less peer as identifier 1; TestRFC6286NonZeroRouterIDAccepted requires a peer-level 0.0.0.1 to become identifier 1. Auditor overlay mutants, all red: removing the zero check in parseRouterID (both zero negatives), bypassing parseRouterID in GlobalsFromTree only (the global-leaf test alone), widening the check to id < 2 (both 0.0.0.1 positives). Limit: a config with no router-id at either level reaches PeersFromTree as identifier 0; only the config mandatory check (validate_mandatory_bgp.go) refuses it, and no test tagged to this row exercises that path.
`RFC6286-2.1-2`	The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. (Section 2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1 - Definition of the BGP Identifier	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC6286LocalIdentifierUniqueWithinItsAS` positive`unit/verifyTestRouterIDClaimConcurrentOnlyOneWins` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: the negative case -- ze accepting a duplicate -- is the operator-selected `bgp/session/allow-shared-router-id true` path, which is conformant precisely because the requirement is a lowercase "should", so there is no violation for a negative test to catch. Enforcement is proven by TestRouterIDClaimConcurrentOnlyOneWins and the TestRouterIDConflict* family; the opt-out by TestValidateOpenAllowSharedRouterID
`RFC6286-2.2-1`	If the BGP Identifier field of the OPEN message is zero, or if it is the same as the BGP Identifier of the local BGP speaker and the message is from an internal peer, then the Error Subcode is set to "Bad BGP Identifier". (Section 2.2)
	MUST	2.2 - Open Message Error Handling	positive`unit/verifyTestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier` positive`unit/verifyTestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier` positive`unit/verifyTestProcessOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier` negative`unit/verifyTestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`
`RFC6286-2.2-2`	If the BGP Identifier field of the OPEN message is zero, or if it is the same as the BGP Identifier of the local BGP speaker and the message is from an internal peer, then the Error Subcode is set to "Bad BGP Identifier". (Section 2.2)
	MUST	2.2 - Open Message Error Handling	positive`unit/verifyTestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier` positive`unit/verifyTestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier` negative`unit/verifyTestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier` negative`unit/verifyTestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`
`RFC6286-2.3-1`	If the BGP Identifiers of the peers involved in the connection collision are identical, then the connection initiated by the BGP speaker with the larger AS number is preserved. (Section 2.3)
	MUST	2.3 - Connection Collision Resolution	positive`unit/verifyTestDetectCollisionEqualIdentifierPrefersLargerAS` negative`unit/verifyTestDetectCollisionEqualIdentifierPrefersLargerAS`

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC6286-2.1-1` The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. The value of the BGP Identifier for a BGP speaker is determined on startup and is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer. (Section 2.1)	{partial}, Partial proof; remaining gap	tested "non-zero integer"; gap "is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer"; owner-approved deviation (spec-bgp-open-session-rfc-defects Q2, owner 2026-10-13: "we should have a global router-id which can be overwritten per peer which is over what the RFC allows"), not counted conformant: the global `router-id` is the default and a peer or group may override it with the `session router-id` leaf, and each OPEN carries its own peer's identifier, so a configured override gives that peer an identifier different from the others'; internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go::parsePeerSettings reads the override. The non-zero clause is enforced: parseRouterID rejects 0.0.0.0 for the global leaf and a per-peer override

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

`RFC6286-2.1-1`

The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. The value of the BGP Identifier for a BGP speaker is determined on startup and is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer. (Section 2.1)

Scoped tag-claim records only: tested "non-zero integer"; gap "is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer"; owner-approved deviation (spec-bgp-open-session-rfc-defects Q2, owner 2026-10-13: "we should have a global router-id which can be overwritten per peer which is over what the RFC allows"), not counted conformant: the global `router-id` is the default and a peer or group may override it with the `session router-id` leaf, and each OPEN carries its own peer's identifier, so a configured override gives that peer an identifier different from the others'; internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go::parsePeerSettings reads the override. The non-zero clause is enforced: parseRouterID rejects 0.0.0.0 for the global leaf and a per-peer override; zero whole-requirement credit.

Audit verdict: partial (the tests enforce only the declared tested scope; the whole requirement remains unmet), fresh. Re-judged 2026-10-14 (independent auditor) after d667673f7e; supersedes the pending rejudge-rfc6286.json. Row is {partial}. Tested: 'non-zero integer'. Gap: 'is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer', an owner-approved deviation (spec-bgp-open-session-rfc-defects Q2, 2026-10-13): the per-peer session router-id override read by Producer internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go::parsePeerSettings gives a peer an identifier different from the others'; not counted conformant. Within Tested: config_test.go::TestParsePeerFromTreeInvalid zero_router_id_rejected requires a peer-level 0.0.0.0 to be refused with the RFC 6286 Section 2.1 error; rfc6286_router_id_test.go::TestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected requires PeersFromTree to refuse a global bgp router-id of 0.0.0.0 with that error and to accept 0.0.0.1, inherited by an override-less peer as identifier 1; TestRFC6286NonZeroRouterIDAccepted requires a peer-level 0.0.0.1 to become identifier 1. Auditor overlay mutants, all red: removing the zero check in parseRouterID (both zero negatives), bypassing parseRouterID in GlobalsFromTree only (the global-leaf test alone), widening the check to id < 2 (both 0.0.0.1 positives). Limit: a config with no router-id at either level reaches PeersFromTree as identifier 0; only the config mandatory check (validate_mandatory_bgp.go) refuses it, and no test tagged to this row exercises that path.

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected`	unit/verify	revert, verified
negative	`TestRFC6286NonZeroRouterIDAccepted`	unit/verify	revert, verified
positive	`TestParsePeerFromTreeInvalid`	unit/verify	revert, verified
positive	`TestRFC6286GlobalZeroRouterIDRejected`	unit/verify	revert, verified

`RFC6286-2.1-2`

The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. (Section 2.1)

Audit verdict: enforced (the tests do what the requirement demands), fresh. {single-polarity: positive} valid: lowercase should, the duplicate is the operator's allow-shared-router-id opt-out. Both halves of 'unique within an AS' now covered: remote peers by TestRouterIDClaimConcurrentOnlyOneWins (accepted == 1, routerIDConflictError); this speaker's own identifier by TestRFC6286LocalIdentifierUniqueWithinItsAS, which presents the local identifier 0x01020301 from an internal peer (AS 65001 both sides) on handleOpen and requires ErrBadBGPIdentifier, NOTIFICATION 2/3 on the wire and no OpenConfirm. Producer read: Open.ValidateBGPIdentifier (internal && id == localID). Judge break (overlay, open.go: the self check gated on !internal) turned the new unit red, the remote-peer unit green. Revert record on ValidateBGPIdentifier for the new unit; the HEAD unit still carries no record (proof by reading: the exact accepted == 1 assertion).

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
positive	`TestRouterIDClaimConcurrentOnlyOneWins`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestRFC6286LocalIdentifierUniqueWithinItsAS`	unit/verify	revert, verified

`RFC6286-2.2-1`

If the BGP Identifier field of the OPEN message is zero, or if it is the same as the BGP Identifier of the local BGP speaker and the message is from an internal peer, then the Error Subcode is set to "Bad BGP Identifier". (Section 2.2)

Audit verdict: enforced (the tests do what the requirement demands), fresh. (a) accepting an OPEN whose BGP Identifier is zero; (b) TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier: zero from internal and from external wantErr with NotifyOpenMessage / NotifyOpenBadBGPID; negative: 1 and 0xFFFFFFFF accepted. The same unit also proves the sentence's second clause (local id from internal rejected, from external accepted). handleOpen and processOpen rails tagged positive too.

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestProcessOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven

`RFC6286-2.2-2`

Audit verdict: enforced (the tests do what the requirement demands), fresh. (a) accepting the local identifier from an internal peer, or rejecting it from an external one; (b) TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier rows 'local identifier from internal peer' wantErr 2/3 and 'from external peer' no error, plus localID+-1 accepted; zero rows cover the first clause. TestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier repeats both polarities on the FSM rail.

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
negative	`TestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestOpenValidateBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestHandleOpenRejectsBadBGPIdentifier`	unit/verify	unproven

`RFC6286-2.3-1`

If the BGP Identifiers of the peers involved in the connection collision are identical, then the connection initiated by the BGP speaker with the larger AS number is preserved. (Section 2.3)

Audit verdict: enforced (the tests do what the requirement demands), fresh. (a) with identical identifiers, preserving the connection of the smaller AS; (b) TestDetectCollisionEqualIdentifierPrefersLargerAS asserts accept/close for peer AS > local AS and peer AS < local AS with equal identifiers; negative rows show unequal identifiers ignore the AS.

Polarity	Test	Kind and tier	Proof state
negative	`TestDetectCollisionEqualIdentifierPrefersLargerAS`	unit/verify	unproven
positive	`TestDetectCollisionEqualIdentifierPrefersLargerAS`	unit/verify	unproven

Extraction sign-off

Field	Value
Reviewer	ze-work agent, spec-rfcgate-6, rfc6286
Signed off	2026-08-31
Register	prose
Source	rfc/full/rfc6286.txt
Source fingerprint	c09b7508ad62e214
Record	rfc/extraction/rfc6286.json
Mapped sentences	0
Declined as scope	3
Relocated to a spec, which Ze OWES	0
Unclassified	0

Sections

Section	Name	Sites	Disposition	Reason
`front`	not stated	2	walked	Title block, Abstract, Status of This Memo and Copyright Notice. Walked rather than skipped because the site scan attributes two sites here, both excluded below: the Abstract's restatement of what the document does to RFC 4271, and the IETF Trust Legal Provisions boilerplate. Nothing before section 1 binds a BGP speaker.
`1`	Introduction	1	walked	Introduction. Reports that RFC 4271 specifies the BGP Identifier as a valid IPv4 host address assigned to the speaker, that deployed code requires two speakers to carry distinct Identifiers, and that this document relaxes both so an IPv6-only network can comply. Its one site, 1:1, is that report and is excluded below. The relaxed definition itself is stated in section 2.1.
`2`	Protocol Revisions, the parent heading	0	walked	Protocol Revisions, the parent heading. One sentence naming what the revisions cover: the definition of the BGP Identifier and the procedures for a speaker that supports the AS-wide Unique BGP Identifier. It directs nobody; 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 carry the obligations.
`2.1`	Definition of the BGP Identifier	0	walked	Definition of the BGP Identifier. The obligation is the indented replacement text: 'The BGP Identifier is a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer that should be unique within an AS. The value of the BGP Identifier for a BGP speaker is determined on startup and is the same for every local interface and every BGP peer.' It is written in the indicative with a lowercase 'should', so neither the capitalised scan nor the modal scan attributes a site to this section, and both ids read from it are declared unsourced here. RFC6286-2.1-1 is the 4-octet, unsigned, NON-ZERO definition, whose non-zero half ze enforces on reception through Open.ValidateBGPIdentifier and refuses to originate through parseRouterID (internal/component/bgp/reactor/config.go). RFC6286-2.1-2 is the lowercase 'should' of AS-wide uniqueness, enforced by default through the claim registry in internal/component/bgp/reactor/routerid_unique.go, which keys routerIDKey on (peer AS, identifier), with bgp/session/allow-shared-router-id as the operator opt-out the advisory level permits.
`2.2`	Open Message Error Handling	0	walked	Open Message Error Handling. The obligation is the indented replacement text for RFC 4271 section 6.2: 'If the BGP Identifier field of the OPEN message is zero, or if it is the same as the BGP Identifier of the local BGP speaker and the message is from an internal peer, then the Error Subcode is set to "Bad BGP Identifier".' Written in the indicative with no modal at all, so no scan attributes a site to this section. It states two rejection conditions and the second is gated on the peer being internal, which is why the summary declares two ids and both are declared unsourced here. Session.validateOpenIdentifier (internal/component/bgp/reactor/session_open_validation.go) is the producer for both, on the handleOpen and processOpen rails.
`2.3`	Connection Collision Resolution	0	walked	Connection Collision Resolution. The obligation is the indented extension to RFC 4271 section 6.8: 'If the BGP Identifiers of the peers involved in the connection collision are identical, then the connection initiated by the BGP speaker with the larger AS number is preserved.' Indicative, no modal, no site. Declared unsourced here as RFC6286-2.3-1. The lead-in scopes it to an external peer, because an internal peer presenting this speaker's identifier is already rejected by 2.2, and the closing sentence says the extension covers 4-octet AS numbers [RFC4893]. Both facts qualify the same single obligation and neither adds one.
`3`	Remarks	0	walked	Remarks. Five indicative observations, none of which directs a speaker: an Identifier allocated per RFC 4271 already fits the revised definition; a confederation counts as one AS for the purpose of AS-wide uniqueness; a speaker supporting this cannot share an Identifier with an external neighbor until that neighbor is upgraded, which is a consequence of the un-upgraded neighbor still applying RFC 4271's stricter test; and the Identifier is also used in AGGREGATOR, in the route-reflection attributes and in route selection. The section's own closing sentence states its purpose: to conclude that the revisions introduce no backward compatibility issue. The confederation observation scopes the lowercase 'should' of 2.1 and adds no obligation of its own, so it earns no id; rfc/short/rfc6286.md carries all five observations under Remarks.
`4`	Security Considerations	0	walked	Security Considerations. Two sentences: this extension introduces no new security considerations, and BGP's are discussed in RFC 4271. No countermeasure is directed at a speaker.
`5`	Acknowledgments	0	skipped (acknowledgements)	Acknowledgments.
`6`	Normative References: RFC 4271 and RFC 4893	0	skipped (references)	Normative References: RFC 4271 and RFC 4893.

Excluded sentences

Site	Excluded kind	Reason	Quote
`front:1`	`not-a-requirement` never bound Ze the sentence states a fact or describes another document, and directs no implementation	The Abstract, non-normative by RFC convention and word-for-word the second paragraph of section 1. Its lowercase 'required' is inside a report of the document's own editorial effect on RFC 4271 -- it 'relaxes the "uniqueness" requirement so that only Autonomous-System-wide (AS-wide) uniqueness of the BGP Identifiers is required' -- which states what scope the revised requirement has, not an obligation on a speaker. The obligation itself is the indented replacement text of section 2.1, invisible to both scans and declared as unsourced RFC6286-2.1-1 and RFC6286-2.1-2 there.	To accommodate situations where the current requirements for the BGP Identifier are not met, this document relaxes the definition of the BGP Identifier to be a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer and relaxes the "uniqueness" requirement so that only Autonomous-System- wide (AS-wide) uniqueness of the BGP Identifiers is required.
`front:2`	`not-a-requirement` never bound Ze the sentence states a fact or describes another document, and directs no implementation	Boilerplate the extractor did not strip: the IETF Trust Legal Provisions paragraph of the Copyright Notice. Its lowercase 'must' binds a party extracting Code Components from the document text, and directs no protocol behavior at a BGP speaker. RFC 6286 contains no code component: it revises three prose paragraphs of RFC 4271 and defines no syntax.	Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
`1:1`	`not-a-requirement` never bound Ze the sentence states a fact or describes another document, and directs no implementation	The Introduction's second paragraph, the same report as front:1 with the IPv6-only network named as the motivating case. It says what this document does to RFC 4271's text, so its lowercase 'required' describes the new scope of the uniqueness requirement rather than imposing one. Classified not-a-requirement rather than duplicate-of because a duplicate must name an id another site MAPS, and no site of this document maps anything: every obligation is stated in the indicative and is declared unsourced on 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.	To accommodate situations where the current requirements for the BGP Identifier are not met (such as in the case of an IPv6-only network), this document relaxes the definition of the BGP Identifier to be a 4-octet, unsigned, non-zero integer and relaxes the "uniqueness" requirement so that only AS-wide uniqueness of the BGP Identifiers is required.

Superseded

No document obsoletes RFC 6286, so its obligations are stated where they were written.