Experimental

RFC 5709 - OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 5709, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways86.7%13 of 15 binding obligations

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason13.3%2 of 15 binding obligations

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 15 binding obligations

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 15 binding obligations

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 28 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs15of 20 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 15 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below

The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 15 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Experimental
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	20
Gated MUST-level	15
Obligations that bind Ze	15
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	28
Tagged units	28
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	0
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc5709.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc5709.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc5709.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication (RFC 5709, AuType 2): 13 MET (HMAC-SHA-256, AuType=2, Auth-Data-Length, crypto sequence, trailer digest, Apad fill, Ko derivation, Ipad/Opad, checksum-zero, receive recompute, Key-ID selection, key rollover) + 2 single-polarity positive (per-KeyID algorithm config, no revert-to-unauthenticated on expiry). Shares RFC 7474 Sign/Verify backend

What the public ledger says

Status: Experimental

What the ledger says is covered:

OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication path.

What the ledger says remains:

Same OSPF experimental status.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	13	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	2	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	15	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (13): RFC5709-3-1, RFC5709-3.1-1, RFC5709-3.1-2, RFC5709-3.1-3, RFC5709-3.1-4, RFC5709-3.3-1, RFC5709-3.3-2, RFC5709-3.3-3, RFC5709-3.3-4, RFC5709-3.3-5, RFC5709-3.4-1, RFC5709-3.4-2, RFC5709-3.2-1

Annotated instead of tested (2): RFC5709-3-5, RFC5709-3.2-2

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC5709-3-1`	Implement HMAC-SHA-256 for OSPFv2 Cryptographic Authentication (Section 3)
	MUST	3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3-2`	Implement HMAC-SHA-1 (Section 3)
	SHOULD	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5709-3-3`	Implement Keyed-MD5 for backwards compatibility with RFC 2328 deployments (Section 3)
	SHOULD	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5709-3-4`	Implement HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 (Section 3)
	MAY	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5709-3-5`	Allow operators to configure any supported algorithm for any given Key ID value (Section 3)
	MUST	3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: keyConfig binds KeyID and Algorithm independently and resolveChainKeys/signKey honor each per-key algorithm with no fixed algorithm-per-KeyID mapping, so this is a permissive config capability with no forbidden (supported-algorithm, KeyID) pairing to reject (internal/plugins/ospf/auth_keystore.go:239-253, :292-324)
`RFC5709-3.1-1`	Set AuType to 2 (Cryptographic Authentication) for SHA/HMAC-authenticated packets (Section 3.1)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestEngineSignPacketCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthStoreSignVerify`
`RFC5709-3.1-2`	Set the Authentication Data Length field to the hash length in bytes (20/32/48/64) (Section 3.1)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthCryptoRejectsExtraTrailerBytes`
`RFC5709-3.1-3`	Set the 32-bit Cryptographic Sequence Number per RFC 2328 Appendix D (Section 3.1)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthReplay`
`RFC5709-3.1-4`	Append the computed digest after the OSPF packet (Authentication Trailer), not inside the 8-byte auth field (Section 3.1, Section 3.3)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthCryptoRejectsExtraTrailerBytes`
`RFC5709-3.3-1`	Fill the Authentication Trailer with Apad (0x878FE1F3 repeated L/4 times) before computing the hash (Section 3.3)
	MUST	3.3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3.3-2`	Derive Ko to length L: Ko = K, H(K), or K zero-padded to L (Section 3.3)
	MUST	3.3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3.3-3`	Compute First-Hash = H(Ko XOR Ipad \|\| OSPFv2 Packet) and Second-Hash = H(Ko XOR Opad \|\| First-Hash) (Section 3.3)
	MUST	3.3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3.3-4`	Place Second-Hash as the Authentication Data of length L in the trailer (Section 3.3)
	MUST	3.3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3.3-5`	Set the OSPF header Checksum field to 0 for AuType 2 packets, per RFC 2328 D.4.3 (Section 3.3, RFC 2328 D.4.3)
	MUST	3.3	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthCryptoChecksumOctetAuthenticated`
`RFC5709-3.4-1`	On receive, save the wire digest, replace the trailer with Apad, recompute, and compare (Section 3.4)
	MUST	3.4	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthSignVerifyCrypto`
`RFC5709-3.4-2`	Select algorithm/key on receive implicitly from the packet's Key ID (Section 3.4)
	MUST	3.4	positive`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthCryptoRejectsKeyIDMismatch` negative`unit/verifyTestOSPFAuthCryptoRejectsKeyIDMismatch`
`RFC5709-3.2-1`	Ensure a new key's KeyStartGenerate <= the old key's KeyStopGenerate on rollover (Section 3.2)
	MUST	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestKeyRolloverOverlapAccepted` negative`unit/verifyTestKeyRolloverGapRejected`
`RFC5709-3.2-2`	Revert to an unauthenticated condition when the last key expires (Section 3.2)
	MUST NOT	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestSignKeyNoRevertWhenAllExpired` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: selectSendKey returns the most-recently-starting key when every send-lifetime has expired and signKey never yields AuTypeNull for a resolved chain, so the forbidden revert-to-unauthenticated transition is structurally absent and there is no packet-reject direction (internal/plugins/ospf/auth_keystore.go:263-287)
`RFC5709-3.2-3`	Set KeyStartAccept < KeyStartGenerate and KeyStopGenerate < KeyStopAccept (Section 3.2)
	SHOULD	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5709-3.2-4`	Never send the Authentication Key or Algorithm over the wire in cleartext; persist key storage across restart (Section 3.2)
	SHOULD	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

RFC 5709 declares no gap, and every gated MUST it carries has a test bound to it.

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.