Experimental

RFC 5310 - IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 5310, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways50.0%4 of 8 binding obligations

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason50.0%4 of 8 binding obligations

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 8 binding obligations

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 8 binding obligations

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 16 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs9of 12 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope1of 9 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below

The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 8 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Experimental
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	12
Gated MUST-level	9
Obligations that bind Ze	8
Not applicable, so out of scope	1
Declared gaps	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	16
Tagged units	16
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	0
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc5310.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc5310.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc5310.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication (HMAC-SHA, Authentication TLV type 3): nine MUST-level requirements. Eight are met with tags in internal/plugins/isis (sharing the auth backend enrolled for RFC 5304): 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 (Level-1 area and Level-2 domain authentication with the correct key chain), 3.2-3 (Hello/IIH link-level authentication), and 4-2 (accept a PDU signed by any currently-valid key during a key rollover) carry positive+negative tags; 3.2-5 (sign over the padded PDU), 3.4-1 (the HMAC pre-image includes the auth-type byte and TLV length with Apad in the value region), 3.4-2 (pad then sign), and 4-1 (the LSP HMAC excludes the Checksum and Remaining Lifetime) are {single-polarity: positive} (no reject path exists for these construction properties). 3.2-6 (do not include the auth value in the optional per-PDU Checksum TLV) is {not-applicable}: ze implements no such optional Checksum TLV.

What the public ledger says

Status: Experimental

What the ledger says is covered:

HMAC-SHA authentication path.

What the ledger says remains:

Same IS-IS experimental status.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	4	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	5	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	9	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (4): RFC5310-3.2-1, RFC5310-3.2-2, RFC5310-3.2-3, RFC5310-4-2

Annotated instead of tested (5): RFC5310-3.2-5, RFC5310-3.2-6, RFC5310-3.4-1, RFC5310-3.4-2, RFC5310-4-1

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC5310-3.2-1`	Level 1 Sequence Number PDUs "SHALL use the Area Authentication string, as in Level 1 Link State PDUs" (§3.2)
	SHALL	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthEngineSignLevel` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthChainSelection`
`RFC5310-3.2-2`	Level 2 Sequence Number PDUs shall use the domain authentication string, as in Level 2 Link State PDUs (§3.2)
	SHALL	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthEngineSignLevel` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthLevelChainCrossUseL2`
`RFC5310-3.2-3`	"IS-IS HELLO PDUs SHALL use the Link Level Authentication string" (§3.2)
	SHALL	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthReject` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthReject`
`RFC5310-3.2-5`	"The CRYPTO_AUTH result for the IS-IS HELLO PDUs SHALL be calculated after the PDU is padded to the MTU size, if padding is not disabled" (§3.2)
	SHALL	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISHelloSignedOverPaddedPDU` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: ze always pads the IIH before signing it (circuit/runtime.go:273-276 for LAN, :293-304 for P2P), so there is no sign-before-pad code path and no negative (unpadded-sign) behavior to assert. The positive is proven in TestISISHelloSignedOverPaddedPDU: the bytes handed to the signer are already padded to MTU-LLC and carry Padding TLV 8
`RFC5310-3.2-6`	Implementations that support the optional checksum for the Sequence Number PDUs and IS-IS HELLO PDUs "MUST NOT include the Checksum TLV" (§3.2)
	MUST NOT	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {not-applicable}: the antecedent is false -- ze implements no optional IS-IS per-PDU Checksum TLV (internal/plugins/isis/packet/tlv.go has no TLV 12 codec), so this conditional MUST NOT has no applicable code path
`RFC5310-3.4-1`	"An implementation MUST fill the authentication type and the length before the authentication data is computed" (§3.4)
	MUST	3.4	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthHMACSHAApadPreimage` positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthSignVerifyHMACSHA256` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: ze always builds the Authentication TLV with the auth-type byte and sets the TLV length before the digest is computed (auth_sign.go:47-52), then runs the HMAC over the full signed PDU (auth_sign.go:274-276), so no code path omits the type or length from the pre-image and there is no negative to assert. The positive is proven by the known-answer TestISISAuthHMACSHAApadPreimage (the re-hashed pre-image still carries the type byte and length) and the on-wire type-3 round-trip TestISISAuthSignVerifyHMACSHA256
`RFC5310-3.4-2`	"The authentication data for the IS-IS IIH PDUs MUST be computed after the IS-IS Hello (IIH) has been padded to the MTU size, if padding is not explicitly disabled" (§3.4)
	MUST	3.4	positive`unit/verifyTestISISHelloSignedOverPaddedPDU` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: ze pads the IIH before signing it (circuit/runtime.go:273-276 pads then signs), with no sign-before-pad code path, so no negative (auth-computed-before-padding) behavior exists to assert. The positive is proven in TestISISHelloSignedOverPaddedPDU: the signer receives the PDU already padded to MTU-LLC
`RFC5310-4-1`	"the remaining lifetime of the LSP MUST be set to zero before computing the authentication", so that field is not authenticated (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthLSPChecksumAfterSign` positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthRotationOverlapAccepts` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: ze always zeroes the Checksum and Remaining Lifetime before the LSP digest (auth_sign.go:268-272), so those fields are never part of the HMAC. The exclusion is observable only as non-rejection -- a post-sign Remaining-Lifetime change still verifies -- and there is no field-included code path that rejects, so no negative exists. The positive is proven in TestISISAuthLSPChecksumAfterSign and the HMAC-SHA-256 type-3 LSP round-trip TestISISAuthRotationOverlapAccepts
`RFC5310-4-2`	"implementations MUST be able to store and use more than one key at the same time" (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthRotation` positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthRotationOverlapAccepts` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthKeyIDMismatchRejected` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthWrongKeyRejected`
`RFC5310-3.5-1`	When the calculated data and the received authentication data do not match, the PDU is discarded and "an error event SHOULD be logged" (§3.5)
	SHOULD	3.5	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5310-3.2-4`	The IS-IS HELLO PDU Link Level Authentication string "MAY be different from that of Link State PDUs" (§3.2)
	MAY	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5310-3.5-2`	"An implementation MAY have a transition mode where it includes CRYPTO_AUTH information in the PDUs but does not verify this information" as a migration aid (§3.5)
	MAY	3.5	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC5310-3.2-6` Implementations that support the optional checksum for the Sequence Number PDUs and IS-IS HELLO PDUs "MUST NOT include the Checksum TLV" (§3.2)	no test	no test carries this requirement id; annotated {not-applicable}: the antecedent is false -- ze implements no optional IS-IS per-PDU Checksum TLV (internal/plugins/isis/packet/tlv.go has no TLV 12 codec), so this conditional MUST NOT has no applicable code path

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

`RFC5310-3.2-1`

Level 1 Sequence Number PDUs "SHALL use the Area Authentication string, as in Level 1 Link State PDUs" (§3.2)