Experimental

RFC 5304 - IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 5304, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways87.5%7 of 8 binding obligations

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason12.5%1 of 8 binding obligations

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 8 binding obligations

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 8 binding obligations

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 16 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs9of 14 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope1of 9 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below

The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 8 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	ok	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Experimental
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	14
Gated MUST-level	9
Obligations that bind Ze	8
Not applicable, so out of scope	1
Declared gaps	0
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	16
Tagged units	16
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	0
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc5304.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc5304.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc5304.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication (HMAC-MD5, Authentication TLV type 54): nine MUST-level requirements. Eight are met with positive+negative tags in internal/plugins/isis: 2-1 and 2-2 (Level-1 area and Level-2 domain authentication with the correct key chain), 2-3 (Hello/IIH link-level authentication), 2-6 (reject a PDU whose HMAC does not match), 2-7 (a signed purge carries only the Authentication TLV), 2-8 (do not accept an unauthenticated purge under configured auth), and 2-9 (reject a purge carrying extra TLVs). 2-4 (sign over the padded PDU) is {single-polarity: positive} with a new test capturing the bytes handed to the signer. 2-5 (do not include the auth value in the per-PDU Checksum TLV) is {not-applicable}: ze implements no optional IS-IS per-PDU Checksum TLV (no TLV 12 codec), so the conditional MUST NOT is vacuous.

What the public ledger says

Status: Experimental

What the ledger says is covered:

Interface and level key-chain authentication.

What the ledger says remains:

Same IS-IS experimental status.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	7	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	2	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	9	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (7): RFC5304-2-1, RFC5304-2-2, RFC5304-2-3, RFC5304-2-6, RFC5304-2-7, RFC5304-2-8, RFC5304-2-9

Annotated instead of tested (2): RFC5304-2-4, RFC5304-2-5

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC5304-2-1`	Level 1 Sequence Number PDUs SHALL use the Area Authentication string as in Level 1 Link State PDUs (§2)
	SHALL	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthEngineSignLevel` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthChainSelection`
`RFC5304-2-2`	Level 2 Sequence Number PDUs SHALL use the domain authentication string as in Level 2 Link State PDUs (§2)
	SHALL	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthEngineSignLevel` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthLevelChainCrossUseL2`
`RFC5304-2-3`	IS-IS Hello PDUs SHALL use the Link Level Authentication String (§2)
	SHALL	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthReject` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthReject`
`RFC5304-2-4`	The HMAC-MD5 result for the IS-IS Hello PDUs SHALL be calculated after the packet is padded to the MTU size, if padding is not disabled (§2)
	SHALL	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISHelloSignedOverPaddedPDU` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: the LAN/P2P hello is padded then signed in one straight-line path (internal/plugins/isis/circuit/runtime.go:273-276), and there is no unpadded-sign code path to drive a negative
`RFC5304-2-5`	Implementations that support the optional checksum for the Sequence Number PDUs and IS-IS Hello PDUs MUST NOT include the Checksum TLV (§2)
	MUST NOT	2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {not-applicable}: the antecedent is false -- ze implements no optional IS-IS per-PDU/SNP Checksum TLV (internal/plugins/isis/packet has no TLV 12 codec; only the LSP header Fletcher checksum field exists), so this conditional MUST NOT has no applicable code path
`RFC5304-2-6`	An implementation that implements HMAC-MD5 authentication and receives HMAC-MD5 Authentication Information MUST discard the PDU if the Authentication Value is incorrect (§2)
	MUST	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthSignVerifyHMACMD5` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthConstantTimeCompare` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthWrongKeyRejected`
`RFC5304-2-7`	ISes (routers) that implement HMAC-MD5 authentication and initiate LSP purges MUST remove the body of the LSP and add the authentication TLV (§2)
	MUST	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge`
`RFC5304-2-8`	ISes implementing HMAC-MD5 authentication MUST NOT accept unauthenticated purges (§2)
	MUST NOT	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge`
`RFC5304-2-9`	ISes MUST NOT accept purges that contain TLVs other than the authentication TLV (§2)
	MUST NOT	2	positive`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge` negative`unit/verifyTestISISAuthPurge`
`RFC5304-2.1-1`	If an inbound LSP with an authentication failure has the local System ID and a higher Sequence Number than the IS-IS process has, the process SHOULD increase its own LSP Sequence Number accordingly and re-flood the LSPs (§2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5304-2-10`	The Link Level Authentication String used by IS-IS Hello PDUs MAY be different from that of Link State PDUs (§2)
	MAY	2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5304-2-11`	An implementation MAY have a transition mode where it includes HMAC-MD5 Authentication Information in PDUs but does not verify the HMAC-MD5 Authentication Information (§2)
	MAY	2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5304-2-12`	An implementation MAY check a set of passwords when verifying the Authentication Value (§2)
	MAY	2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5304-2-13`	An implementation that does not implement HMAC-MD5 authentication MAY accept a PDU that contains the HMAC-MD5 Authentication Type (§2)
	MAY	2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC5304-2-5` Implementations that support the optional checksum for the Sequence Number PDUs and IS-IS Hello PDUs MUST NOT include the Checksum TLV (§2)	no test	no test carries this requirement id; annotated {not-applicable}: the antecedent is false -- ze implements no optional IS-IS per-PDU/SNP Checksum TLV (internal/plugins/isis/packet has no TLV 12 codec; only the LSP header Fletcher checksum field exists), so this conditional MUST NOT has no applicable code path

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

`RFC5304-2-1`

Level 1 Sequence Number PDUs SHALL use the Area Authentication string as in Level 1 Link State PDUs (§2)