Supported

RFC 5282 - Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 5282, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways78.9%15 of 19 gated MUSTs

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason0.0%0 of 19 gated MUSTs

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 19 gated MUSTs

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

Proven by a recorded break100.0%30 of 30 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs19of 30 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 19 gated MUSTs

an obligation that does not bind Ze. A {not-applicable} annotation says it never bound; a {feature-declined} annotation says its condition is an optional feature Ze does not offer, and quotes the RFC sentence that makes it optional. Scope, not coverage: it stays in the denominator every share on this page is taken over

Not applicable0.0%0 of 19 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze, so no test is owed for it. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Met below Ze0.0%0 of 19 gated MUSTs

a {lower-layer} annotation says a layer under Ze performs the behavior, on state Ze installs into that layer, and names the producer that installs it. The obligation binds Ze and is met; Ze proves none of it, because its own boundary carries no value the behavior reads

Optional feature declined0.0%0 of 19 gated MUSTs

a {feature-declined} annotation says the obligation is conditional on a feature the RFC makes optional and Ze does not offer, and it quotes the sentence that makes it optional. The condition is false, so nothing is owed and nothing is missing. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Negative

what Ze owes

No test at all21.1%4 of 19 gated MUSTs

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

The 7 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 19 gated MUSTs: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	bad	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Not applicable	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Met below Ze	neutral	no color: an obligation met below Ze is neither a test Ze wrote nor work Ze owes, and the two green shares above are what says how much Ze proves itself
Optional feature declined	neutral	no color: an obligation whose condition Ze never meets is neither an achievement nor a failure. The absent FEATURE is disclosed on the RFC's own status row, as an implementation gap a later scope decision can revisit
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Supported
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	30
Gated MUST-level	19
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	0
Gated with no test	4
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	30
Tagged units	30
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	30
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc5282.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc5282.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc5282.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: Using AEAD Algorithms with the IKEv2 Encrypted Payload (RFC 5282): ze speaks one AEAD cipher for the IKE SA, ENCR_AES_GCM_16 (Transform ID 20) at 128 and 256 bits. buildSKMessageAEADWithMsgID (engine/auth.go) seals an 8-octet IV, a salt-then-IV 12-octet nonce and the IKE-header-through-SK-generic-header associated data; decryptSKPayload and crypto.DecryptIKEAEAD (crypto/cipher.go) open it. encKeyMaterialLen (crypto/keys.go) gives SK_ei and SK_er the RFC 4106 KEYMAT layout (cipher key then 4-octet salt) and leaves SK_ai and SK_ar at zero octets. No AES CCM: aeadSaltBytes holds one entry and specifiedEncryption (crypto/proposal.go) accepts no CCM transform off the wire. Of the 19 gated rows, every row that binds an AES GCM implementation now carries a both-polarity tagged test and a discrimination record. The AES CCM rows (RFC5282-3.2-3, RFC5282-3.2-4, RFC5282-4-3, RFC5282-4-4) carry neither test nor annotation: ze implements no AES CCM, so no code produces the behavior, and ai/rules/rfc-compliance.md reserves gap, not-applicable and feature-declined for an owner answer.

What the public ledger says

Status: Supported

What the ledger says is covered

AES-GCM IKEv2 AEAD encryption and decryption framing: the eight-octet IV, the salt-then-IV twelve-octet nonce, the full-length sixteen-octet ICV, the associated data from the fixed header through the Encrypted payload's own generic header, any Padding up to 255 octets on receipt, the KEYMAT layout of SK_ei and SK_er, and the negotiation rules that carry the Key Length attribute and refuse an integrity transform.

What the ledger says remains

AES CCM is not implemented. specifiedEncryption (crypto/proposal.go) accepts no CCM transform off the wire and aeadSaltBytes (crypto/transform.go) holds one entry, so the AES CCM rows of the checklist name behavior no layer performs and carry no test. Whether they are conformance debt or an optional feature ze declined is an owner answer, not this summary's.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	15	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	0	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	4	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	19	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (15): RFC5282-3-1, RFC5282-3.1-1, RFC5282-3.1-2, RFC5282-3.2-1, RFC5282-3.2-2, RFC5282-4-1, RFC5282-4-2, RFC5282-5.1-1, RFC5282-5.1-2, RFC5282-7.1-1, RFC5282-7.1-2, RFC5282-7.3-1, RFC5282-7.3-2, RFC5282-8-1, RFC5282-8-2

No test and no annotation (4): RFC5282-3.2-3, RFC5282-3.2-4, RFC5282-4-3, RFC5282-4-4

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC5282-3-1`	The recipient MUST accept any amount of Padding up to 255 octets (§3)
	MUST	3	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADReceiveAcceptsAnyPaddingTo255` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADReceiveRefusesATruncatedInnerPayload`
`RFC5282-3.1-1`	The Initialization Vector MUST be eight octets (§3.1)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADSendIVIsEightOctets` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADReceiveRefusesAnIVThatIsNotEightOctets`
`RFC5282-3.1-2`	The IV MUST be chosen by the encryptor in a manner that ensures the same IV value is used only once for a given key (§3.1)
	MUST	3.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADSendIVIsUniquePerKey` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADSendIVDoesNotRepeatForARepeatedMessage`
`RFC5282-3.2-1`	AES GCM implementations MUST support a full-length 16 octet ICV (§3.2)
	MUST	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADSendICVIsSixteenOctets` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADReceiveRefusesADamagedICV`
`RFC5282-3.2-2`	AES GCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 16, 8 and 12 octets (§3.2)
	MUST NOT	3.2	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADRefusesAForbiddenICVLength` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADOpensTheFullLengthICV`
`RFC5282-3.2-3`	AES CCM implementations MUST support ICV sizes of 8 octets and 16 octets (§3.2)
	MUST	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-3.2-4`	AES CCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 8, 16 and 12 octets (§3.2)
	MUST NOT	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-4-1`	For AES GCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADNonceIsSaltThenIV` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADRefusesAReversedNonce`
`RFC5282-4-2`	For AES GCM a 12 octet nonce MUST be used (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADNonceIsTwelveOctets` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADRefusesANonceThatIsNotTwelveOctets`
`RFC5282-4-3`	For AES CCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-4-4`	For AES CCM an 11 octet nonce MUST be used (§4)
	MUST	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-5.1-1`	The associated data MUST consist of the message from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the last octet of the Encrypted Payload's Payload Header, including any payloads between them (§5.1)
	MUST	5.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADAssociatedDataCoversAnInterveningPayload` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADRefusesAnAlteredInterveningPayload`
`RFC5282-5.1-2`	The Initialization Vector and Ciphertext fields MUST NOT be included in the associated data (§5.1)
	MUST NOT	5.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADAssociatedDataExcludesTheIVAndCiphertext` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADRefusesAssociatedDataCoveringTheIV`
`RFC5282-7.1-1`	With an AEAD cipher the SK_ai and SK_ar integrity keys are unused, and each MUST be treated as having a size of zero octets (§7.1)
	MUST	7.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADIntegrityKeysAreZeroOctets` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282NonAEADIntegrityKeysAreDerived`
`RFC5282-7.1-2`	Each of SK_ei and SK_er MUST have the size and format of the KEYMAT for the AES key size in use, the cipher key followed by the salt (§7.1)
	MUST	7.1	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADEncryptionKeysCarryTheirSalt` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282NonAEADEncryptionKeysCarryNoSalt`
`RFC5282-7.3-1`	The Key Length attribute MUST be specified whenever an AES GCM or AES CCM encryption transform identifier is used (§7.3)
	MUST	7.3	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADProposalCarriesTheKeyLengthAttribute` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADOfferWithoutAKeyLengthIsRefused`
`RFC5282-7.3-2`	The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128, 192, or 256 (§7.3)
	MUST	7.3	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADKeyLengthAcceptsTheThreeValues` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADKeyLengthRefusesEveryOtherValue`
`RFC5282-8-1`	When an authenticated encryption algorithm is selected as the encryption algorithm for any SA, an integrity algorithm MUST NOT be selected for that SA (§8)
	MUST NOT	8	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADSelectionCarriesNoIntegrityAlgorithm` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADOfferWithIntegrityIsRefused`
`RFC5282-8-2`	If all of the encryption algorithms in a proposal are authenticated encryption algorithms, the proposal MUST NOT propose any integrity transforms (§8)
	MUST NOT	8	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC5282AEADIKEProposalCarriesNoIntegrityTransform` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC5282NonAEADIKEProposalKeepsItsIntegrityTransform`
`RFC5282-4-5`	Specific authenticated encryption algorithms SHOULD use the default nonce format (§4)
	SHOULD	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-7.2-1`	A 16-octet ICV size SHOULD be used with IKEv2 (§7.2)
	SHOULD	7.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-7.2-2`	The use of 12-octet ICVs, transform identifiers 15 and 19, is discouraged (§7.2)
	NOT RECOMMENDED	7.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-7.2-3`	If an ICV size larger than 8 octets is appropriate, 16-octet ICVs SHOULD be used (§7.2)
	SHOULD	7.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-7.3-3`	The use of the Key Length value 192 is discouraged (§7.3)
	NOT RECOMMENDED	7.3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-7.3-4`	If an AES key larger than 128 bits is appropriate, a 256-bit AES key SHOULD be used (§7.3)
	SHOULD	7.3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-3-2`	Padding MAY contain any value chosen by the sender (§3)
	MAY	3	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-3.1-3`	The encryptor MAY generate the IV in any manner that ensures uniqueness (§3.1)
	MAY	3.1	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-3.2-5`	AES GCM implementations MAY support 8 or 12 octet ICVs (§3.2)
	MAY	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-3.2-6`	AES CCM implementations MAY also support 12 octet ICVs (§3.2)
	MAY	3.2	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC5282-4-6`	Specific authenticated encryption algorithms MAY use different nonce formats (§4)
	MAY	4	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC5282-3.2-3` AES CCM implementations MUST support ICV sizes of 8 octets and 16 octets (§3.2)	no test	no test carries this requirement id
`RFC5282-3.2-4` AES CCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 8, 16 and 12 octets (§3.2)	no test	no test carries this requirement id
`RFC5282-4-3` For AES CCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4)	no test	no test carries this requirement id
`RFC5282-4-4` For AES CCM an 11 octet nonce MUST be used (§4)	no test	no test carries this requirement id

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.