a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids
Supported
RFC 5282 - Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol
Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 5282, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.
Overview
Positive
what Ze has
the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it
one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which
a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed
Neutral
measures that are neither good news nor bad
MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands
a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below
Negative
what Ze owes
no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why
The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 19 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.
How to read the colors
A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.
| Card | Tone here | Why that color |
|---|---|---|
| Gated MUSTs | neutral | no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total |
| Out of scope | neutral | no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim |
| Tested both ways | ok | green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got |
| One polarity plus reason | ok | green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it |
| One polarity, unexcused | ok | green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half |
| No test at all | bad | green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated |
| Proven by a recorded break | ok | green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above |
| Audit verdicts | warn | RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current |
At a glance
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Public status | Supported |
| Enrolment | Enrolled |
| Requirements | 30 |
| Gated MUST-level | 19 |
| Obligations that bind Ze | 19 |
| Not applicable, so out of scope | 0 |
| Declared gaps | 0 |
| Gated with no test | 18 |
| Nightly-only evidence | 0 |
| Test tags | 2 |
| Tagged units | 2 |
| Recorded audit verdicts | 0 |
| Discrimination records | 0 |
| Summary | rfc/short/rfc5282.md |
| Requirement shard | rfc/requirements/rfc5282.md |
| RFC text | rfc/full/rfc5282.txt |
Enrolment
Enrolled: Using AEAD Algorithms with the IKEv2 Encrypted Payload (RFC 5282): ze speaks one AEAD cipher for the IKE SA, ENCR_AES_GCM_16 (Transform ID 20) at 128 and 256 bits. buildSKMessageAEADWithMsgID (engine/auth.go) seals an 8-octet IV, a salt-then-IV 12-octet nonce and the IKE-header-through-SK-generic-header associated data; decryptSKPayload and crypto.DecryptIKEAEAD (crypto/cipher.go) open it. encKeyMaterialLen (crypto/keys.go) gives SK_ei and SK_er the RFC 4106 KEYMAT layout (cipher key then 4-octet salt) and leaves SK_ai and SK_ar at zero octets. No AES CCM: aeadSaltBytes holds one entry and specifiedEncryption (crypto/proposal.go) accepts no CCM transform off the wire. 19 gated rows, none tested and none annotated at enrolment -- the coverage backlog is reported rather than annotated away, because ai/rules/rfc-compliance.md reserves gap and not-applicable for an owner answer.
What the public ledger says
Status: Supported
What the ledger says is covered:
AES-GCM IKEv2 AEAD encryption and decryption framing.What the ledger says remains:
No tracked gap in current source anchors.Coverage
| Bucket | Count | What it counts |
|---|---|---|
| Positive and negative tests | 1 | one part of the gated population |
| Annotated instead of tested | 0 | one part of the gated population |
| One polarity only | 0 | one part of the gated population |
| No test and no annotation | 18 | one part of the gated population |
| Evidence that runs nightly only | 0 | an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in |
| Gated MUST-level requirements | 19 | every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above |
Positive and negative tests (1): RFC5282-8-2
No test and no annotation (18): RFC5282-3-1, RFC5282-3.1-1, RFC5282-3.1-2, RFC5282-3.2-1, RFC5282-3.2-2, RFC5282-3.2-3, RFC5282-3.2-4, RFC5282-4-1, RFC5282-4-2, RFC5282-4-3, RFC5282-4-4, RFC5282-5.1-1, RFC5282-5.1-2, RFC5282-7.1-1, RFC5282-7.1-2, RFC5282-7.3-1, RFC5282-7.3-2, RFC5282-8-1
Requirements
| Requirement | Level | Section | Tests |
|---|---|---|---|
RFC5282-3-1 | The recipient MUST accept any amount of Padding up to 255 octets (§3) | ||
| MUST | 3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.1-1 | The Initialization Vector MUST be eight octets (§3.1) | ||
| MUST | 3.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.1-2 | The IV MUST be chosen by the encryptor in a manner that ensures the same IV value is used only once for a given key (§3.1) | ||
| MUST | 3.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-1 | AES GCM implementations MUST support a full-length 16 octet ICV (§3.2) | ||
| MUST | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-2 | AES GCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 16, 8 and 12 octets (§3.2) | ||
| MUST NOT | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-3 | AES CCM implementations MUST support ICV sizes of 8 octets and 16 octets (§3.2) | ||
| MUST | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-4 | AES CCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 8, 16 and 12 octets (§3.2) | ||
| MUST NOT | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-4-1 | For AES GCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4) | ||
| MUST | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-4-2 | For AES GCM a 12 octet nonce MUST be used (§4) | ||
| MUST | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-4-3 | For AES CCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4) | ||
| MUST | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-4-4 | For AES CCM an 11 octet nonce MUST be used (§4) | ||
| MUST | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-5.1-1 | The associated data MUST consist of the message from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the last octet of the Encrypted Payload's Payload Header, including any payloads between them (§5.1) | ||
| MUST | 5.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-5.1-2 | The Initialization Vector and Ciphertext fields MUST NOT be included in the associated data (§5.1) | ||
| MUST NOT | 5.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.1-1 | With an AEAD cipher the SK_ai and SK_ar integrity keys are unused, and each MUST be treated as having a size of zero octets (§7.1) | ||
| MUST | 7.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.1-2 | Each of SK_ei and SK_er MUST have the size and format of the KEYMAT for the AES key size in use, the cipher key followed by the salt (§7.1) | ||
| MUST | 7.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.3-1 | The Key Length attribute MUST be specified whenever an AES GCM or AES CCM encryption transform identifier is used (§7.3) | ||
| MUST | 7.3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.3-2 | The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128, 192, or 256 (§7.3) | ||
| MUST | 7.3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-8-1 | When an authenticated encryption algorithm is selected as the encryption algorithm for any SA, an integrity algorithm MUST NOT be selected for that SA (§8) | ||
| MUST NOT | 8 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-8-2 | If all of the encryption algorithms in a proposal are authenticated encryption algorithms, the proposal MUST NOT propose any integrity transforms (§8) | ||
| MUST NOT | 8 | ||
RFC5282-4-5 | Specific authenticated encryption algorithms SHOULD use the default nonce format (§4) | ||
| SHOULD | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.2-1 | A 16-octet ICV size SHOULD be used with IKEv2 (§7.2) | ||
| SHOULD | 7.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.2-2 | The use of 12-octet ICVs, transform identifiers 15 and 19, is discouraged (§7.2) | ||
| NOT RECOMMENDED | 7.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.2-3 | If an ICV size larger than 8 octets is appropriate, 16-octet ICVs SHOULD be used (§7.2) | ||
| SHOULD | 7.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.3-3 | The use of the Key Length value 192 is discouraged (§7.3) | ||
| NOT RECOMMENDED | 7.3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-7.3-4 | If an AES key larger than 128 bits is appropriate, a 256-bit AES key SHOULD be used (§7.3) | ||
| SHOULD | 7.3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3-2 | Padding MAY contain any value chosen by the sender (§3) | ||
| MAY | 3 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.1-3 | The encryptor MAY generate the IV in any manner that ensures uniqueness (§3.1) | ||
| MAY | 3.1 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-5 | AES GCM implementations MAY support 8 or 12 octet ICVs (§3.2) | ||
| MAY | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-3.2-6 | AES CCM implementations MAY also support 12 octet ICVs (§3.2) | ||
| MAY | 3.2 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
RFC5282-4-6 | Specific authenticated encryption algorithms MAY use different nonce formats (§4) | ||
| MAY | 4 | positive
no testno positive testnegative
no testno negative test |
|
Gaps and untested MUSTs
| Requirement | State | Reason |
|---|---|---|
RFC5282-3-1 The recipient MUST accept any amount of Padding up to 255 octets (§3) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.1-1 The Initialization Vector MUST be eight octets (§3.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.1-2 The IV MUST be chosen by the encryptor in a manner that ensures the same IV value is used only once for a given key (§3.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.2-1 AES GCM implementations MUST support a full-length 16 octet ICV (§3.2) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.2-2 AES GCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 16, 8 and 12 octets (§3.2) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.2-3 AES CCM implementations MUST support ICV sizes of 8 octets and 16 octets (§3.2) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-3.2-4 AES CCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 8, 16 and 12 octets (§3.2) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-4-1 For AES GCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-4-2 For AES GCM a 12 octet nonce MUST be used (§4) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-4-3 For AES CCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-4-4 For AES CCM an 11 octet nonce MUST be used (§4) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-5.1-1 The associated data MUST consist of the message from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the last octet of the Encrypted Payload's Payload Header, including any payloads between them (§5.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-5.1-2 The Initialization Vector and Ciphertext fields MUST NOT be included in the associated data (§5.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-7.1-1 With an AEAD cipher the SK_ai and SK_ar integrity keys are unused, and each MUST be treated as having a size of zero octets (§7.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-7.1-2 Each of SK_ei and SK_er MUST have the size and format of the KEYMAT for the AES key size in use, the cipher key followed by the salt (§7.1) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-7.3-1 The Key Length attribute MUST be specified whenever an AES GCM or AES CCM encryption transform identifier is used (§7.3) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-7.3-2 The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128, 192, or 256 (§7.3) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
RFC5282-8-1 When an authenticated encryption algorithm is selected as the encryption algorithm for any SA, an integrity algorithm MUST NOT be selected for that SA (§8) |
no test | no test carries this requirement id |
Proof state
A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.
RFC5282-3-1
The recipient MUST accept any amount of Padding up to 255 octets (§3)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.1-1
The Initialization Vector MUST be eight octets (§3.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.1-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.1-2
The IV MUST be chosen by the encryptor in a manner that ensures the same IV value is used only once for a given key (§3.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.1-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.2-1
AES GCM implementations MUST support a full-length 16 octet ICV (§3.2)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.2-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.2-2
AES GCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 16, 8 and 12 octets (§3.2)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.2-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.2-3
AES CCM implementations MUST support ICV sizes of 8 octets and 16 octets (§3.2)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.2-3, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-3.2-4
AES CCM implementations MUST NOT support ICV lengths other than 8, 16 and 12 octets (§3.2)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-3.2-4, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-4-1
For AES GCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-4-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-4-2
For AES GCM a 12 octet nonce MUST be used (§4)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-4-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-4-3
For AES CCM the default nonce format MUST be used, the salt concatenated with the IV in that order (§4)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-4-3, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-4-4
For AES CCM an 11 octet nonce MUST be used (§4)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-4-4, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-5.1-1
The associated data MUST consist of the message from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the last octet of the Encrypted Payload's Payload Header, including any payloads between them (§5.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-5.1-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-5.1-2
The Initialization Vector and Ciphertext fields MUST NOT be included in the associated data (§5.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-5.1-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-7.1-1
With an AEAD cipher the SK_ai and SK_ar integrity keys are unused, and each MUST be treated as having a size of zero octets (§7.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-7.1-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-7.1-2
Each of SK_ei and SK_er MUST have the size and format of the KEYMAT for the AES key size in use, the cipher key followed by the salt (§7.1)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-7.1-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-7.3-1
The Key Length attribute MUST be specified whenever an AES GCM or AES CCM encryption transform identifier is used (§7.3)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-7.3-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-7.3-2
The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128, 192, or 256 (§7.3)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-7.3-2, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-8-1
When an authenticated encryption algorithm is selected as the encryption algorithm for any SA, an integrity algorithm MUST NOT be selected for that SA (§8)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
No test carries RFC5282-8-1, so no unit is bound to it.
RFC5282-8-2
If all of the encryption algorithms in a proposal are authenticated encryption algorithms, the proposal MUST NOT propose any integrity transforms (§8)
Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests
| Polarity | Test | Kind and tier | Proof state |
|---|---|---|---|
| negative | TestRFC5282NonAEADIKEProposalKeepsItsIntegrityTransform |
unit/verify | unproven |
| positive | TestRFC5282AEADIKEProposalCarriesNoIntegrityTransform |
unit/verify | unproven |
Extraction sign-off
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Reviewer | claude-opus-5 (ipsecwalk), spec-rfcgate-6-supported-extraction-signoff |
| Signed off | 2026-08-31 |
| Register | prose |
| Source | rfc/full/rfc5282.txt |
| Source fingerprint | e4b60d44518cbcd7 |
| Record | rfc/extraction/rfc5282.json |
| Mapped sentences | 16 |
| Declined as scope | 3 |
| Relocated to a spec, which Ze OWES | 0 |
| Unclassified | 0 |
Sections
| Section | Name | Sites | Disposition | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
front |
Status of This Memo, Abstract and Table of Contents | 0 | skipped (front-matter) | Status of This Memo, Abstract and Table of Contents. |
1 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
1.1 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
3 |
not stated | 1 | walked | not stated |
3.1 |
not stated | 2 | walked | not stated |
3.2 |
not stated | 3 | walked | not stated |
4 |
not stated | 2 | walked | not stated |
5 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
5.1 |
not stated | 2 | walked | not stated |
5.2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
6 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
7 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
7.1 |
not stated | 2 | walked | not stated |
7.2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
7.3 |
not stated | 2 | walked | not stated |
8 |
not stated | 3 | walked | not stated |
9 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.1 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.1.1 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.1.2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.1.3 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.1.4 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.1 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.2 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.3 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.4 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.5 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.2.6 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
10.3 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
11 |
not stated | 0 | walked | not stated |
12 |
not stated | 1 | skipped (iana) | IANA Considerations: the transform identifiers were already assigned for ESP, and the AEAD registry rows are a registry action rather than an implementation obligation. |
13 |
Acknowledgments | 0 | skipped (acknowledgements) | Acknowledgments. |
14 |
References | 0 | skipped (references) | References. |
14.1 |
Normative References | 0 | skipped (references) | Normative References. |
14.2 |
Informative References | 1 | skipped (references) | Informative References. |
Excluded sentences
| Site | Excluded kind | Reason | Quote |
|---|---|---|---|
8:1 |
cross-documentnever bound Ze the obligation belongs to another document that this one only cites |
The sentence states what RFC 4306 Section 3.3.3 requires, so the obligation it carries belongs to that document; it is quoted here only as the rule the next two sentences update. Sites 8:2 and 8:3 carry the update this document makes, and both are mapped. | IKEv2 (Section 3.3.3 of [RFC4306]) specifies that both an encryption algorithm and an integrity checking algorithm are required for an IKE SA (Security Association). |
12:1 |
not-a-requirementnever bound Ze the sentence states a fact or describes another document, and directs no implementation |
An IANA statement that no registry action is needed for the transform identifiers this document reuses. It imposes nothing on an implementation, and the lowercase 'required' the prose scan matched is the report of an absence. | No IANA actions are required for this usage extension. |
14.2:1 |
not-a-requirementnever bound Ze the sentence states a fact or describes another document, and directs no implementation |
IPR boilerplate reproduced from the informative reference section. It addresses 'any interested party' about patent disclosure and states no protocol behavior. | The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. |
Superseded
No document obsoletes RFC 5282, so its obligations are stated where they were written.