Partial

RFC 3579 - RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 3579, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways54.8%17 of 31 gated MUSTs

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason0.0%0 of 31 gated MUSTs

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 31 gated MUSTs

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

Proven by a recorded break94.3%33 of 35 tagged units, 2 escaped and 0 lapsed

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs31of 50 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 31 gated MUSTs

an obligation that does not bind Ze. A {not-applicable} annotation says it never bound; a {feature-declined} annotation says its condition is an optional feature Ze does not offer, and quotes the RFC sentence that makes it optional. Scope, not coverage: it stays in the denominator every share on this page is taken over

Not applicable0.0%0 of 31 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze, so no test is owed for it. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Met below Ze0.0%0 of 31 gated MUSTs

a {lower-layer} annotation says a layer under Ze performs the behavior, on state Ze installs into that layer, and names the producer that installs it. The obligation binds Ze and is met; Ze proves none of it, because its own boundary carries no value the behavior reads

Optional feature declined0.0%0 of 31 gated MUSTs

a {feature-declined} annotation says the obligation is conditional on a feature the RFC makes optional and Ze does not offer, and it quotes the sentence that makes it optional. The condition is false, so nothing is owed and nothing is missing. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Negative

what Ze owes

No test at all45.2%14 of 31 gated MUSTs

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

The 7 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 31 gated MUSTs: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	bad	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Not applicable	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Met below Ze	neutral	no color: an obligation met below Ze is neither a test Ze wrote nor work Ze owes, and the two green shares above are what says how much Ze proves itself
Optional feature declined	neutral	no color: an obligation whose condition Ze never meets is neither an achievement nor a failure. The absent FEATURE is disclosed on the RFC's own status row, as an implementation gap a later scope decision can revisit
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Partial
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	50
Gated MUST-level	31
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	14
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	35
Tagged units	35
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	35
Summary	`rfc/short/rfc3579.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/rfc3579.md`
RFC text	`rfc/full/rfc3579.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: RADIUS/EAP, ze in the NAS (RADIUS client) role: 31 MUST-level requirements. Ze runs the conversation this document describes, for operator login. `internal/component/radius/dict.go` declares EAP-Message at 79, `SignMessageAuthenticator` (`internal/component/radius/packet.go`) signs every EAP-bearing Access-Request beside the two verifiers that were there first, and `authenticateEAP` (`internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go`) answers each Access-Challenge instead of rejecting it. The obligations addressed to the RADIUS authentication server, to a RADIUS proxy and to a security server are excluded in `rfc/extraction/rfc3579.json` as `binds-another-role`: ze binds an ephemeral UDP socket in `NewClient` and `(*Client).readLoop` dispatches a datagram only against a waiter `(*Client).Exchange` registered for its own outstanding request, so no Access-Request receive path exists anywhere in the tree.

What the public ledger says

Status: Partial

What the ledger says is covered

Ze is the NAS and runs the RADIUS/EAP conversation for operator login, with auth-method eap-md5 or eap-mschapv2. It encapsulates one EAP packet per RADIUS packet in consecutive EAP-Message attributes split at 253 octets (appendEAPMessage, eapPacketFrom, internal/component/radius/eap.go), signs every EAP-bearing Access-Request (SignMessageAuthenticator, internal/component/radius/packet.go), silently discards a reply whose Message-Authenticator does not verify ((*Client).dispatchResponse, internal/component/radius/client.go), and answers each Access-Challenge with the peer's EAP-Response and the challenge's State unmodified (authenticateEAP, internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go). It copies the peer's own EAP-Response/Identity Type-Data into User-Name on every request of the conversation, validates each server EAP header before the peer sees it, processes the EAP-Message attributes before it reads the reply code, and never offers a password credential in place of the configured EAP method. Ze answers EAP itself, as the peer, rather than passing frames through.

What the ledger says remains

Fourteen MUST-level requirements are unproven or unreached, and none of them changes what an operator can configure. The pass-through architecture accounts for most: ze answers EAP for the operator and forwards no EAP frame, so Section 2.1's EAP-Start and the Nak relay have no path, and the Section 2.2 Error-Cause 202 branch cannot fire because ze holds no queue of EAP-Responses for its antecedent to match. Four prohibitions hold by construction and are tagged by nothing, because a test would have to observe a packet no code path can build: Sections 2.1, 2.6.3 and 2.6.5. EAP-TLS is implemented in the peer (internal/core/eap) and not offered by auth-method, which needs an operator certificate and key. Ze's PPP NAS never negotiates EAP, so the Section 4.3.6 obligations that bind a NAS whose peers require EAP are unreached. The IPsec-for-RADIUS profile of Section 4.2 is absent: ze offers no way to run RADIUS over an IPsec SA and no zero-length shared secret. Section 4.3.4's ban on sharing a secret between an EAP NAS and a User-Password NAS is not checked at config load.

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	17	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	14	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	31	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (17): RFC3579-1-1, RFC3579-1.2-1, RFC3579-2.1-1, RFC3579-2.1-3, RFC3579-2.2-1, RFC3579-2.6.3-1, RFC3579-2.6.3-2, RFC3579-2.6.4-1, RFC3579-3-1, RFC3579-3.1-1, RFC3579-3.1-2, RFC3579-3.1-3, RFC3579-3.1-4, RFC3579-3.2-1, RFC3579-3.3-1, RFC3579-3.3-2, RFC3579-4.3.6-2

Annotated instead of tested (14): RFC3579-1-2, RFC3579-1.2-2, RFC3579-2.1-2, RFC3579-2.2-2, RFC3579-2.6.3-3, RFC3579-2.6.5-1, RFC3579-4.2-1, RFC3579-4.2-2, RFC3579-4.2-3, RFC3579-4.3.4-1, RFC3579-4.3.6-1, RFC3579-4.3.6-3, RFC3579-4.3.6-4, RFC3579-4.3.6-5

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`RFC3579-1-1`	"a NAS that is unable to offer EAP service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes for EAP" (§1)
	MUST NOT	1 - Introduction	positive`unit/verifyTestRFC2869DictionaryCoversTheServicesZeOffers` negative`unit/verifyTestRFC2869DictionaryDeclaresNoAttributeForAnUnofferedService`
`RFC3579-1-2`	"A NAS MUST treat a RADIUS Access-Accept requesting an unavailable service as an Access-Reject instead" (§1)
	MUST	1 - Introduction	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: `(*radiusAuthenticator).result` rejects an Access-Accept whose Service-Type is not Login-User (`AcceptedServiceType`, internal/component/radius/attr.go), which is the RFC 2865 form of this rule and covers the EAP path too, because authenticateEAP returns through that same function. What stays untested is this document's own form of the rule, an Accept concluding an EAP conversation ze could not run: `parseAuthMethod` refuses an unknown auth-method at config load, so ze only ever runs a method it offers and the branch has no input
`RFC3579-1.2-1`	A displayable message "MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol" (§1.2)
	MUST NOT	1.2 - Terminology	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapNotificationIsAnsweredAndLogged` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapNotificationDoesNotSteerTheLogin`
`RFC3579-1.2-2`	"The message encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC2279]" (§1.2)
	MUST	1.2 - Terminology	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze now DECODES a displayable message -- `(*PeerSession).notificationResponse` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) carries the Type-2 Request's text out and `processEAPMessage` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) logs it -- and encodes none. This sentence binds whoever encodes the message, and ze writes no Reply-Message and sends no Notification Request, so nothing here chooses an encoding to assert
`RFC3579-2.1-1`	"Reception of a RADIUS Access-Reject packet MUST result in the NAS denying access to the authenticating peer" (§2.1, restated later in §2.1)
	MUST	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAccessRejectDeniesAccess` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAccessRejectDeniesEvenCarryingEAPSuccess`
`RFC3579-2.1-2`	"The NAS MUST NOT \"manufacture\" a Success or Failure packet as the result of a timeout" (§2.1)
	MUST NOT	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: every EAP packet ze puts on the RADIUS wire came out of `(eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go), and a timeout returns an error from `(Client).SendToServers` that `authenticateEAP` passes up, so no branch manufactures a Success or Failure. Nothing tags the prohibition, because a test would have to observe a packet no code path can build
`RFC3579-2.1-3`	"if the NAS initially sends an EAP-Request/Identity message to the peer, the NAS MUST copy the contents of the Type-Data field of the EAP-Response/Identity received from the peer into the User-Name attribute and MUST include the Type-Data field of the EAP-Response/Identity in the User-Name attribute in every subsequent Access-Request" (§2.1)
	MUST	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapUserNameIsThePeerIdentity` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapUserNameRidesEverySubsequentRequest`
`RFC3579-2.2-1`	"the NAS MUST validate the EAP header fields (Code, Identifier, Length) prior to forwarding an EAP packet to or from the RADIUS server" (§2.2)
	MUST	2.2 - Invalid Packets	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapReadsTheServerEAPHeaderFields` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapRefusesAMalformedServerEAPHeader`
`RFC3579-2.2-2`	On an Access-Challenge carrying Error-Cause 202, "a new EAP-Response packet, if available, MUST be sent to the RADIUS server within an Access-Request, and the EAP-Message attribute(s) included within the Access-Challenge are silently discarded" (§2.2)
	MUST	2.2 - Invalid Packets	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze reads no Error-Cause attribute, so an Access-Challenge carrying 202 is answered like any other. The MUST is conditional -- "If so" refers to additional EAP-Response packets received matching the current Identifier -- and ze holds no such queue: it is its own peer, and `(*eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) returns exactly one Response per Request. So the antecedent never holds and there is no second Response to send
`RFC3579-2.6.3-1`	"The NAS MUST make its access control decision based solely on the RADIUS Packet Type (Access-Accept/Access-Reject)" (§2.6.3)
	MUST	2.6.3 - Conflicting Messages	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapDecisionFollowsTheRadiusCode` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAcceptWithEapFailureStillAuthorizes`
`RFC3579-2.6.3-2`	"The access control decision MUST NOT be based on the contents of the EAP packet encapsulated in one or more EAP-Message attributes, if present" (§2.6.3)
	MUST NOT	2.6.3 - Conflicting Messages	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAcceptWithEapFailureStillAuthorizes` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapDecisionFollowsTheRadiusCode`
`RFC3579-2.6.3-3`	"the NAS MUST NOT \"manufacture\" EAP packets in order to correct contradictory messages that it receives" (§2.6.3)
	MUST NOT	2.6.3 - Conflicting Messages	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: `authenticateEAP` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) sends only what `(*eap.PeerSession).Process` returned, and on a contradictory reply it logs the peer's objection and drops it rather than correcting it. Nothing tags the prohibition, because a test would have to observe a manufactured packet no code path can build
`RFC3579-2.6.4-1`	"the NAS MUST first process the attributes, including the EAP-Message attribute(s), prior to processing the Accept/Reject indication" (§2.6.4)
	MUST	2.6.4 - Priority	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapProcessesTheEAPMessageBeforeTheCode` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapProcessesAnUnparseableEAPMessageBeforeTheCode`
`RFC3579-2.6.5-1`	"Reply-Message attribute(s) MUST NOT be included in any RADIUS message containing an EAP-Message attribute" (§2.6.5)
	MUST NOT	2.6.5 - Displayable Messages	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: `eapCredential` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) builds an EAP-bearing Access-Request from the EAP-Message run, the Message-Authenticator and the server's State, and appends no Reply-Message; `exchange` adds Service-Type, NAS-Identifier, User-Name and NAS-IP-Address, none of them Reply-Message. The exclusion holds by construction and no test tags it
`RFC3579-3-1`	"either NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address attributes MUST be included" in an Access-Request (§3)
	MUST	3 - Attributes	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAccessRequestNamesTheNAS` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapNamesTheNASWithoutASourceAddress`
`RFC3579-3.1-1`	"If multiple EAP-Message attributes are contained within an Access-Request or Access-Challenge packet, they MUST be in order and they MUST be consecutive attributes" (§3.1)
	MUST	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`unit/verifyTestEAPMessageConcatenatesOnTheWayIn` positive`unit/verifyTestEAPMessageSplitsAtTheAttributeLimit` negative`unit/verifyTestEAPMessageKeepsTheRunConsecutive`
`RFC3579-3.1-2`	"Multiple EAP packets MUST NOT be encoded within EAP-Message attributes contained within a single Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Request packet" (§3.1)
	MUST NOT	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapOneEAPPacketPerRadiusPacket` negative`unit/verifyTestEAPMessageRefusesASecondRun`
`RFC3579-3.1-3`	"the Message-Authenticator attribute MUST be used to protect all Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and Access-Reject packets containing an EAP-Message attribute" (§3.1, restated §3.2, §3.3 Note 1 and §4.3.2)
	MUST	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAccessRequestIsSignedAndCarriesEAPMessage` negative`unit/verifyTestEAPRequestWithoutMessageAuthenticatorIsRefused`
`RFC3579-3.1-4`	"A NAS supporting the EAP-Message attribute MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-Authenticator and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent" (§3.1, restated for any RADIUS client receiving an Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge at §3.2)
	MUST	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapVerifiedChallengeIsAccepted` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapDiscardsUnauthenticatedChallenge`
`RFC3579-3.2-1`	"Message-Authenticator = HMAC-MD5 (Type, Identifier, Length, Request Authenticator, Attributes)", keyed with the shared secret, with the signature string "considered to be sixteen octets of zero" and the value inserted before the Response Authenticator is calculated (§3.2)
	MUST	3.2 - Message-Authenticator	positive`unit/verifyTestSignMessageAuthenticatorMatchesRFC3579` negative`unit/verifyTestSignMessageAuthenticatorZeroesTheSignatureField`
`RFC3579-3.3-1`	"The EAP-Message and Message-Authenticator attributes specified in this document MUST NOT be present in an Accounting-Request" (§3.3)
	MUST NOT	3.3 - Table of Attributes	positive`unit/verifyTestAccountingRequestRefusesEAPAttributes` negative`unit/verifyTestAccountingRequestRefusesEAPAttributes`
`RFC3579-3.3-2`	"An Access-Request that contains either a User-Password or CHAP-Password or ARAP-Password or one or more EAP-Message attributes MUST NOT contain more than one type of those four attributes" (§3.3 Note 1)
	MUST NOT	3.3 - Table of Attributes	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapAccessRequestIsSignedAndCarriesEAPMessage` negative`unit/verifyTestAccessRequestRefusesTwoCredentialTypes`
`RFC3579-4.2-1`	Where RADIUS runs over IPsec ESP with a non-null transform and no shared secret is configured, "a shared secret of zero length MUST be assumed" (§4.2)
	MUST	4.2 - Security Protocol	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze offers no way to run RADIUS over an IPsec SA and its RADIUS server configuration always carries a secret (`internal/component/radius/config.go`), so the zero-length case is unreachable; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.2-2`	"When IPsec ESP is used with RADIUS, per-packet authentication, integrity and replay protection MUST be used. 3DES-CBC MUST be supported as an encryption transform" (§4.2)
	MUST	4.2 - Security Protocol	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze has no RADIUS-over-IPsec profile, so nothing selects a transform for RADIUS traffic; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.2-3`	"HMAC-SHA1-96 MUST be supported as an authentication transform" (§4.2)
	MUST	4.2 - Security Protocol	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: same absent RADIUS-over-IPsec profile; ze negotiates no IPsec SA for RADIUS traffic; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.3.4-1`	"the RADIUS shared secret used by a NAS supporting EAP MUST NOT be reused by a NAS utilizing the User-Password attribute" (§4.3.4)
	MUST NOT	4.3.4 - Known Plaintext Attacks	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze holds both the admin backend's secret and the subscriber backend's secret and compares neither, so a configuration reusing one secret across an EAP NAS and a PAP NAS is accepted in silence; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-1`	"Should the NAS not be able to negotiate EAP, or should the EAP-Request sent by the NAS be of a different EAP type than what is expected, the authenticating peer MUST disconnect" (§4.3.6)
	MUST	4.3.6 - Negotiation Attacks	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: `(*eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) NAKs toward its one configured method rather than answering a Request of another type, and a server that insists ends the exchange with an error that `authenticateEAP` returns, which ends the login. What is untested is that ending read as this section's disconnect
`RFC3579-4.3.6-2`	"An authenticating peer expecting EAP to be negotiated for a session MUST NOT negotiate a weaker method, such as CHAP or PAP" (§4.3.6)
	MUST NOT	4.3.6 - Negotiation Attacks	positive`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapNeverSendsAPasswordCredential` negative`unit/verifyTestRadiusAdminEapDoesNotDowngradeAfterARejection`
`RFC3579-4.3.6-3`	"if any peers of the NAS MUST do EAP, then the NAS MUST attempt to negotiate EAP for every session" (§4.3.6)
	MUST	4.3.6 - Negotiation Attacks	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze's PPP NAS offers PAP, CHAP-MD5 and MS-CHAPv2 and never EAP (`internal/component/l2tp/ppp`), so it cannot attempt to negotiate EAP for any session; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-4`	"The authenticating peer MUST refuse to renegotiate authentication, even if the renegotiation is from CHAP to EAP" (§4.3.6, restated in the same section for an EAP-capable peer)
	MUST	4.3.6 - Negotiation Attacks	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze's admin login has no renegotiation path, and its PPP NAS never negotiates EAP, so nothing refuses a renegotiation; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-5`	Where EAP was negotiated and the RADIUS server or proxy does not support it, "a PPP NAS MUST send an LCP-Terminate and disconnect the peer" (§4.3.6)
	MUST	4.3.6 - Negotiation Attacks	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ze's PPP NAS never negotiates EAP, so the branch that would send LCP-Terminate on an EAP-incapable server does not exist; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-1.2-3`	An implementation that silently discards a packet "SHOULD provide the capability of logging the error, including the contents of the silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event in a statistics counter" (§1.2)
	SHOULD	1.2 - Terminology	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-4`	"Once EAP has been negotiated, the NAS SHOULD send an initial EAP-Request message to the authenticating peer" (§2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-7`	"After a suitable number of timeouts have elapsed, the NAS SHOULD instead end the EAP conversation" (§2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-8`	On an EAP-Response/Nak "the NAS SHOULD send Access-Request encapsulating the received EAP-Response/Nak" (§2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-9`	Where the peer identity cannot be determined from the EAP-Response, "the User-Name attribute SHOULD be determined by another means" (§2.1)
	SHOULD	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-11`	Where EAP-unaware peers are common, the EAP-Start technique "SHOULD NOT be employed by default" (§2.1)
	SHOULD NOT	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.2-3`	A NAS receiving an Access-Challenge with Error-Cause 202 "SHOULD discard the EAP-Response packet most recently transmitted to the RADIUS server and check whether additional EAP-Response packets have been received matching the current Identifier value" (§2.2)
	SHOULD	2.2 - Invalid Packets	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.6.5-2`	"a NAS receiving a Reply-Message attribute from the RADIUS server SHOULD silently discard the attribute, rather than attempting to translate it to an EAP Notification Request" (§2.6.5)
	SHOULD	2.6.5 - Displayable Messages	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-3-2`	"The NAS-Port or NAS-Port-Id attributes SHOULD be included by the NAS in Access-Request packets" (§3)
	SHOULD	3 - Attributes	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-3.1-5`	"When RADIUS is used to enable EAP authentication, Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and Access-Reject packets SHOULD contain one or more EAP-Message attributes" (§3.1)
	SHOULD	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-3.1-6`	"Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, or Access-Reject packets including EAP-Message attribute(s) without a Message-Authenticator attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS" (§3.1)
	SHOULD	3.1 - EAP-Message	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-4.2-4`	"implementations of this specification SHOULD support IPsec [RFC2401] along with IKE [RFC2409] for key management", and IPsec ESP with a non-null encryption transform and authentication "SHOULD be used" (§4.2)
	SHOULD	4.2 - Security Protocol	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-4.2-5`	"AES-CBC SHOULD be supported" and "SHOULD be offered as a preferred encryption transform if supported", and "DES-CBC SHOULD NOT be used as the encryption transform" (§4.2)
	SHOULD	4.2 - Security Protocol	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-4.3.2-1`	"the Message-Authenticator attribute SHOULD be used in Access-Request packets that do not have a User-Password attribute, in order to establish the identity of the NAS sending the request" (§4.3.2)
	SHOULD	4.3.2 - Spoofing and Hijacking	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2-1`	"A NAS MAY authenticate local peers while at the same time acting as a pass-through for non-local peers and authentication methods it does not implement locally" (§2)
	MAY	2 - RADIUS Support for EAP	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-5`	"A NAS MAY be configured to initiate with a default authentication method" (§2.1)
	MAY	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-6`	"the NAS MAY act as a pass-through, encapsulating the EAP-Response within EAP-Message attribute(s) sent to the RADIUS server within a RADIUS Access-Request packet" (§2.1)
	MAY	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-2.1-10`	"on detecting the presence of the peer, the NAS MAY send an Access-Request packet to the RADIUS server containing an EAP-Message attribute signifying EAP-Start" (§2.1)
	MAY	2.1 - Protocol Overview	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`RFC3579-3.2-2`	The Message-Authenticator attribute "MAY be used to authenticate and integrity-protect Access-Requests in order to prevent spoofing" and "MAY be used in any Access-Request" (§3.2)
	MAY	3.2 - Message-Authenticator	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`RFC3579-1-2` "A NAS MUST treat a RADIUS Access-Accept requesting an unavailable service as an Access-Reject instead" (§1)	{gap}, no test	`(*radiusAuthenticator).result` rejects an Access-Accept whose Service-Type is not Login-User (`AcceptedServiceType`, internal/component/radius/attr.go), which is the RFC 2865 form of this rule and covers the EAP path too, because authenticateEAP returns through that same function. What stays untested is this document's own form of the rule, an Accept concluding an EAP conversation ze could not run: `parseAuthMethod` refuses an unknown auth-method at config load, so ze only ever runs a method it offers and the branch has no input
`RFC3579-1.2-2` "The message encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC2279]" (§1.2)	{gap}, no test	ze now DECODES a displayable message -- `(*PeerSession).notificationResponse` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) carries the Type-2 Request's text out and `processEAPMessage` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) logs it -- and encodes none. This sentence binds whoever encodes the message, and ze writes no Reply-Message and sends no Notification Request, so nothing here chooses an encoding to assert
`RFC3579-2.1-2` "The NAS MUST NOT \"manufacture\" a Success or Failure packet as the result of a timeout" (§2.1)	{gap}, no test	every EAP packet ze puts on the RADIUS wire came out of `(eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go), and a timeout returns an error from `(Client).SendToServers` that `authenticateEAP` passes up, so no branch manufactures a Success or Failure. Nothing tags the prohibition, because a test would have to observe a packet no code path can build
`RFC3579-2.2-2` On an Access-Challenge carrying Error-Cause 202, "a new EAP-Response packet, if available, MUST be sent to the RADIUS server within an Access-Request, and the EAP-Message attribute(s) included within the Access-Challenge are silently discarded" (§2.2)	{gap}, no test	ze reads no Error-Cause attribute, so an Access-Challenge carrying 202 is answered like any other. The MUST is conditional -- "If so" refers to additional EAP-Response packets received matching the current Identifier -- and ze holds no such queue: it is its own peer, and `(*eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) returns exactly one Response per Request. So the antecedent never holds and there is no second Response to send
`RFC3579-2.6.3-3` "the NAS MUST NOT \"manufacture\" EAP packets in order to correct contradictory messages that it receives" (§2.6.3)	{gap}, no test	`authenticateEAP` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) sends only what `(*eap.PeerSession).Process` returned, and on a contradictory reply it logs the peer's objection and drops it rather than correcting it. Nothing tags the prohibition, because a test would have to observe a manufactured packet no code path can build
`RFC3579-2.6.5-1` "Reply-Message attribute(s) MUST NOT be included in any RADIUS message containing an EAP-Message attribute" (§2.6.5)	{gap}, no test	`eapCredential` (internal/component/radius/authenticator_eap.go) builds an EAP-bearing Access-Request from the EAP-Message run, the Message-Authenticator and the server's State, and appends no Reply-Message; `exchange` adds Service-Type, NAS-Identifier, User-Name and NAS-IP-Address, none of them Reply-Message. The exclusion holds by construction and no test tags it
`RFC3579-4.2-1` Where RADIUS runs over IPsec ESP with a non-null transform and no shared secret is configured, "a shared secret of zero length MUST be assumed" (§4.2)	{gap}, no test	ze offers no way to run RADIUS over an IPsec SA and its RADIUS server configuration always carries a secret (`internal/component/radius/config.go`), so the zero-length case is unreachable; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.2-2` "When IPsec ESP is used with RADIUS, per-packet authentication, integrity and replay protection MUST be used. 3DES-CBC MUST be supported as an encryption transform" (§4.2)	{gap}, no test	ze has no RADIUS-over-IPsec profile, so nothing selects a transform for RADIUS traffic; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.2-3` "HMAC-SHA1-96 MUST be supported as an authentication transform" (§4.2)	{gap}, no test	same absent RADIUS-over-IPsec profile; ze negotiates no IPsec SA for RADIUS traffic; spec-radius-admin-eap does not add it
`RFC3579-4.3.4-1` "the RADIUS shared secret used by a NAS supporting EAP MUST NOT be reused by a NAS utilizing the User-Password attribute" (§4.3.4)	{gap}, no test	ze holds both the admin backend's secret and the subscriber backend's secret and compares neither, so a configuration reusing one secret across an EAP NAS and a PAP NAS is accepted in silence; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-1` "Should the NAS not be able to negotiate EAP, or should the EAP-Request sent by the NAS be of a different EAP type than what is expected, the authenticating peer MUST disconnect" (§4.3.6)	{gap}, no test	`(*eap.PeerSession).Process` (internal/core/eap/peer.go) NAKs toward its one configured method rather than answering a Request of another type, and a server that insists ends the exchange with an error that `authenticateEAP` returns, which ends the login. What is untested is that ending read as this section's disconnect
`RFC3579-4.3.6-3` "if any peers of the NAS MUST do EAP, then the NAS MUST attempt to negotiate EAP for every session" (§4.3.6)	{gap}, no test	ze's PPP NAS offers PAP, CHAP-MD5 and MS-CHAPv2 and never EAP (`internal/component/l2tp/ppp`), so it cannot attempt to negotiate EAP for any session; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-4` "The authenticating peer MUST refuse to renegotiate authentication, even if the renegotiation is from CHAP to EAP" (§4.3.6, restated in the same section for an EAP-capable peer)	{gap}, no test	ze's admin login has no renegotiation path, and its PPP NAS never negotiates EAP, so nothing refuses a renegotiation; spec-radius-admin-eap
`RFC3579-4.3.6-5` Where EAP was negotiated and the RADIUS server or proxy does not support it, "a PPP NAS MUST send an LCP-Terminate and disconnect the peer" (§4.3.6)	{gap}, no test	ze's PPP NAS never negotiates EAP, so the branch that would send LCP-Terminate on an EAP-incapable server does not exist; spec-radius-admin-eap

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.