Partial

RFC 1334 - PPP Authentication Protocols

Every requirement this repository extracted from RFC 1334, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways83.3%5 of 6 binding obligations

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason16.7%1 of 6 binding obligations

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 6 binding obligations

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

No test at all0.0%0 of 6 binding obligations

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 12 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs7of 10 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope1of 7 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze. Scope, not coverage: it is in no share below

The 4 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 6 obligations that bind Ze: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

CardTone hereWhy that color
Gated MUSTs neutral no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope neutral no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways ok green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason ok green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused ok green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all ok green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Proven by a recorded break ok green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts warn RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

FieldValue
Public status Partial
Enrolment Enrolled
Requirements 10
Gated MUST-level 7
Obligations that bind Ze 6
Not applicable, so out of scope 1
Declared gaps 0
Gated with no test 0
Nightly-only evidence 0
Test tags 12
Tagged units 12
Recorded audit verdicts 0
Discrimination records 0
Summary rfc/short/rfc1334.md
Requirement shard rfc/requirements/rfc1334.md
RFC text rfc/full/rfc1334.txt

Enrolment

Enrolled: PPP Authentication Protocols (PAP and the LCP Authentication-Protocol option): seven MUST-level requirements. Five are met with positive+negative tags in internal/component/l2tp/ppp: 1-1 (advertise Auth-Protocol in LCP CONFREQ when auth is desired), x-1 (offer CHAP before PAP via the default fallback order), 2.3-1 (Authenticate-Ack Code 2 on accept), 2.3-2 (Authenticate-Nak Code 3 on reject), and 2.3-3 (echo the request Identifier into the reply). 2.3-3 is {single-polarity: positive} (the reply copies the Identifier and never validates or rejects on it). 2.3-4 (the Ack/Nak Message field must not affect operation) is met by a new pppoeclient test proving runClientAuth branches only on Code. 2.2-1 (change Identifier on reissue) is {not-applicable}: ze never reissues a PAP Authenticate-Request.

What the public ledger says

Status: Partial

What the ledger says is covered:

PAP authentication option through PPP auth handling.

What the ledger says remains:

Carries the L2TP and PPPoE Partial status.

Coverage

BucketCountWhat it counts
Positive and negative tests 5 one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested 2 one part of the gated population
One polarity only 0 one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation 0 one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only 0 an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements7every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (5): RFC1334-1-1, RFC1334-x-1, RFC1334-2.3-1, RFC1334-2.3-2, RFC1334-2.3-4

Annotated instead of tested (2): RFC1334-2.2-1, RFC1334-2.3-3

Requirements

RequirementLevelSectionTests
RFC1334-1-1If authentication is desired, specify Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link Establishment phase (Section 1)
MUST 1
RFC1334-x-1Any implementation that includes a stronger authentication method (such as CHAP) must offer to negotiate that method prior to PAP (Security Considerations)
MUST x
positiveunit/verifyTestDefaultAuthFallbackOrder
negativeunit/verifyTestSelectAuthFallback
RFC1334-2.3-1If id/password pair is recognizable and acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Ack (Code=2) (Section 2.3)
MUST 2.3
positiveunit/verifyTestPAPRequestEmitsEvent
negativeunit/verifyTestPAPRejectWritesNak
RFC1334-2.3-2If id/password pair is not recognizable or acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Nak (Code=3) (Section 2.3)
MUST 2.3
positiveunit/verifyTestPAPRejectWritesNak
negativeunit/verifyTestPAPRequestEmitsEvent
RFC1334-2.2-1Identifier field must be changed each time an Authenticate-Request is issued (Section 2.2)
MUST 2.2
positiveno testno positive test
negativeno testno negative test

{not-applicable}: ze never issues a second PAP Authenticate-Request; the authenticator role only responds (internal/component/l2tp/ppp/pap.go:160) and the client issues exactly one request per session with a fixed Identifier and no reissue path (internal/component/l2tp/pppoeclient/session.go:230-241), so the change-Identifier-on-reissue obligation has no code path

RFC1334-2.3-3Ack/Nak Identifier must be copied from the Authenticate-Request which caused the reply (Section 2.3)
MUST 2.3
positiveunit/verifyTestPAPRejectWritesNak
positiveunit/verifyTestPAPRequestEmitsEvent
negativeno testno negative test

{single-polarity}: writePAPReply copies the request Identifier into the PAP reply (internal/component/l2tp/ppp/pap.go:138) and ze never validates or rejects on the Identifier, so there is no negative case

RFC1334-2.3-4Message field must not affect operation of the protocol (Section 2.3)
MUST NOT 2.3
RFC1334-2.3-5Authenticator should take action to terminate the link on Nak (Section 2.3)
SHOULD 2.3
positiveno testno positive test
negativeno testno negative test
RFC1334-2.3-6Message field may be empty (Section 2.3)
MAY 2.3
positiveno testno positive test
negativeno testno negative test
RFC1334-2.2-2Implementations may retry Authenticate-Request at implementation-defined intervals (Section 2.2)
MAY 2.2
positiveno testno positive test
negativeno testno negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

RequirementStateReason
RFC1334-2.2-1 Identifier field must be changed each time an Authenticate-Request is issued (Section 2.2) no test no test carries this requirement id; annotated {not-applicable}: ze never issues a second PAP Authenticate-Request; the authenticator role only responds (internal/component/l2tp/ppp/pap.go:160) and the client issues exactly one request per session with a fixed Identifier and no reissue path (internal/component/l2tp/pppoeclient/session.go:230-241), so the change-Identifier-on-reissue obligation has no code path

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.

RFC1334-1-1

If authentication is desired, specify Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link Establishment phase (Section 1)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
negative TestAuthProtoRejectClearsMethod unit/verify unproven
positive TestLocalCONFREQAdvertisesAuthMethod unit/verify unproven

RFC1334-x-1

Any implementation that includes a stronger authentication method (such as CHAP) must offer to negotiate that method prior to PAP (Security Considerations)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
negative TestSelectAuthFallback unit/verify unproven
positive TestDefaultAuthFallbackOrder unit/verify unproven

RFC1334-2.3-1

If id/password pair is recognizable and acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Ack (Code=2) (Section 2.3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
negative TestPAPRejectWritesNak unit/verify unproven
positive TestPAPRequestEmitsEvent unit/verify unproven

RFC1334-2.3-2

If id/password pair is not recognizable or acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Nak (Code=3) (Section 2.3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
negative TestPAPRequestEmitsEvent unit/verify unproven
positive TestPAPRejectWritesNak unit/verify unproven

RFC1334-2.2-1

Identifier field must be changed each time an Authenticate-Request is issued (Section 2.2)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

No test carries RFC1334-2.2-1, so no unit is bound to it.

RFC1334-2.3-3

Ack/Nak Identifier must be copied from the Authenticate-Request which caused the reply (Section 2.3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
positive TestPAPRejectWritesNak unit/verify unproven
positive TestPAPRequestEmitsEvent unit/verify unproven

RFC1334-2.3-4

Message field must not affect operation of the protocol (Section 2.3)

Audit verdict: not audited: no reader has judged these tests

PolarityTestKind and tierProof state
negative TestPAPReplyMessageDoesNotAffectOutcome unit/verify unproven
positive TestPAPReplyMessageDoesNotAffectOutcome unit/verify unproven

Extraction sign-off

No extraction sign-off exists for RFC 1334, so no reviewer has walked its text sentence by sentence.

Superseded

RFC 1334 is obsoleted by RFC 1994.

RequirementDispositionNow stated atReason
RFC1334-1-1 If authentication is desired, specify Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link Establishment phase (Section 1) restated RFC1994-1-1 RFC 1994 Section 1 repeats the sentence word for word, that an implementation MUST specify the Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link Establishment phase if authentication of the link is desired. The obligation is PPP-wide and binds neither authentication protocol in particular
RFC1334-x-1 Any implementation that includes a stronger authentication method (such as CHAP) must offer to negotiate that method prior to PAP (Security Considerations) dropped not stated RFC 1994 defines CHAP alone and states no obligation to offer a stronger method before PAP. Its Security Considerations warn that authenticating one user name by several methods exposes the least secure of them, and recommend one method per user name, with no keyword. The rule is still owed for as long as PAP is offered
RFC1334-2.3-1 If id/password pair is recognizable and acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Ack (Code=2) (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 defines no PAP packet. Its Section 4.2 obliges a CHAP packet with Code 3 (Success) when the received Response Value equals the expected value, which is the CHAP handshake rather than the PAP Authenticate-Ack. PAP stays defined by RFC 1334, as this summary's forward Meta row records
RFC1334-2.3-2 If id/password pair is not recognizable or acceptable, authenticator must transmit Authenticate-Nak (Code=3) (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.2 obliges a CHAP packet with Code 4 (Failure) when the Response Value does not match, and defines no PAP Authenticate-Nak. The PAP rule is still owed for as long as PAP peers are authenticated
RFC1334-2.2-1 Identifier field must be changed each time an Authenticate-Request is issued (Section 2.2) dropped not stated RFC 1994 states no PAP obligation. Its Section 4.1 requires the Identifier to change each time a Challenge is sent, which binds the CHAP Challenge and not a reissued PAP Authenticate-Request
RFC1334-2.3-3 Ack/Nak Identifier must be copied from the Authenticate-Request which caused the reply (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.2 requires the Success or Failure Identifier to be copied from the Response which caused the reply, which binds CHAP. It states nothing about a PAP Authenticate-Ack or Authenticate-Nak
RFC1334-2.3-4 Message field must not affect operation of the protocol (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.2 carries the same MUST NOT for the Message field of a CHAP Success or Failure packet. It states nothing about the PAP Ack and Nak Message field, which RFC 1334 still defines
RFC1334-2.3-5 Authenticator should take action to terminate the link on Nak (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.2 says a CHAP implementation SHOULD take action to terminate the link when it transmits a Failure. That binds the CHAP exchange, and RFC 1994 states nothing about a PAP Authenticate-Nak
RFC1334-2.3-6 Message field may be empty (Section 2.3) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.2 says the Message field of a CHAP Success or Failure is zero or more octets. It states nothing about the PAP Ack and Nak Message field
RFC1334-2.2-2 Implementations may retry Authenticate-Request at implementation-defined intervals (Section 2.2) dropped not stated RFC 1994 Section 4.1 obliges the authenticator to send further Challenges until a valid Response arrives or a retry counter expires, which is a CHAP obligation on the authenticator. RFC 1994 states nothing about a peer retrying a PAP Authenticate-Request