Partial

DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION - Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate PKI and Autonomous System Provider Authorization

Every requirement this repository extracted from DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION, the tests bound to it, and what a reader has verified about them. This summary is enrolled and gated by ./le rfc check.

Overview

Positive

what Ze has

Tested both ways50.0%4 of 8 gated MUSTs

a positive test proves Ze does what the requirement demands and a negative one proves it refuses what the requirement forbids

One polarity plus reason25.0%2 of 8 gated MUSTs

the requirement admits no counter-case, so one polarity plus a recorded reason is the whole proof available for it

One polarity, unexcused0.0%0 of 8 gated MUSTs

one direction is tested, the other is neither tested nor excused, and nothing states which

Proven by a recorded break0.0%0 of 11 tagged units

a red was observed once under a recorded procedure, and the unit, the claim and the producer it rested on still hash to what was recorded. The break is not re-run. A test pair is not a proof until one has been observed

Neutral

measures that are neither good news nor bad

Gated MUSTs8of 14 this summary declares

MUST-level requirements the gate HOLDS. A population, not a result: the shares beside it are what says how Ze stands

Out of scope0of 8 gated MUSTs

an obligation that does not bind Ze. A {not-applicable} annotation says it never bound; a {feature-declined} annotation says its condition is an optional feature Ze does not offer, and quotes the RFC sentence that makes it optional. Scope, not coverage: it stays in the denominator every share on this page is taken over

Not applicable0.0%0 of 8 gated MUSTs

a {not-applicable} annotation says the obligation does not bind Ze, so no test is owed for it. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Met below Ze0.0%0 of 8 gated MUSTs

a {lower-layer} annotation says a layer under Ze performs the behavior, on state Ze installs into that layer, and names the producer that installs it. The obligation binds Ze and is met; Ze proves none of it, because its own boundary carries no value the behavior reads

Optional feature declined0.0%0 of 8 gated MUSTs

a {feature-declined} annotation says the obligation is conditional on a feature the RFC makes optional and Ze does not offer, and it quotes the sentence that makes it optional. The condition is false, so nothing is owed and nothing is missing. It stays in the denominator every share here is taken over

Negative

what Ze owes

No test at all25.0%2 of 8 gated MUSTs

no test carries the requirement id, whether or not a gap states why

The 7 shares marked as a part above are the whole of the 8 gated MUSTs: they add to 100%. Proven by a recorded break is a share of TAGGED UNITS, a different population, so it is not one of them.

How to read the colors

A color names what the measure MEANS, not how well Ze scores on it. Green is a good outcome at any value, red is a bad one, and neither a population nor a scope count is an outcome, so both take no color. The number under the label is what says how far Ze has got.

Card	Tone here	Why that color
Gated MUSTs	neutral	no color: a population is a scale, and a larger one is neither good news nor bad. It is the accounting total
Out of scope	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Tested both ways	ok	green at every value: a test pair is the outcome this gate exists to produce, and the share under the label is what says how far Ze has got
One polarity plus reason	ok	green at every value: where no counter-case exists, one polarity IS the complete answer, and a recorded reason is what the gate demands beside it
One polarity, unexcused	ok	green at zero, RED above it: half a proof with no reason for the other half
No test at all	bad	green at zero, RED above it: a binding obligation nothing exercises is a claim with nothing behind it, whether or not a reason is stated
Not applicable	neutral	no color: an obligation that never bound Ze is neither an achievement nor a failure, and counting it either way would be a claim
Met below Ze	neutral	no color: an obligation met below Ze is neither a test Ze wrote nor work Ze owes, and the two green shares above are what says how much Ze proves itself
Optional feature declined	neutral	no color: an obligation whose condition Ze never meets is neither an achievement nor a failure. The absent FEATURE is disclosed on the RFC's own status row, as an implementation gap a later scope decision can revisit
Proven by a recorded break	ok	green at every value: an observed break is the outcome the discrimination gate exists to produce. The denominator is TAGGED UNITS, not obligations, so this share is not one of the parts above
Audit verdicts	warn	RED on the first weak, wrong or unimplemented verdict, amber while a verdict is no longer current or a gated MUST is unjudged, green when every one is judged sound and current

At a glance

Field	Value
Public status	Partial
Enrolment	Enrolled
Requirements	14
Gated MUST-level	8
Not applicable, so out of scope	0
Declared gaps	2
Gated with no test	0
Nightly-only evidence	0
Test tags	11
Tagged units	11
Recorded audit verdicts	0
Discrimination records	0
Summary	`rfc/short/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.md`
Requirement shard	`rfc/requirements/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.md`
RFC text	`rfc/drafts/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.txt`

Enrolment

Enrolled: ASPA AS_PATH verification: 4 MET + 2 single-polarity (6-1, 7-2) + 2 gap (6-4 per-AFI records, 8-1 Invalid-not-preferred)

What the public ledger says

Status: Partial

What the ledger says is covered

Section 6 verification algorithm (upstream/downstream), AS_SET to Unknown, prepend collapse, AS0-in-provider rejection, RTR ASPA PDU (Type 11) consumption, and re-validation on cache change. Two MUSTs unmet: per-AFI ASPA records (6-4, the AFI flag is parsed then discarded and the cache is keyed by customer AS alone, so per-AFI records overwrite each other)
Invalid-not-preferred (8-1, ASPA state drives only reject/keep with default LogOnly, so an accepted Invalid route can outrank a Valid one for the same prefix).

What the ledger says remains:

Coverage

Bucket	Count	What it counts
Positive and negative tests	4	one part of the gated population
Annotated instead of tested	4	one part of the gated population
One polarity only	0	one part of the gated population
No test and no annotation	0	one part of the gated population
Evidence that runs nightly only	0	an overlay: each of these is also counted by the part it falls in
Gated MUST-level requirements	8	every gated MUST falls in exactly one bucket above

Positive and negative tests (4): DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-2, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-3, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-x-1, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-7-1

Annotated instead of tested (4): DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-1, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-4, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-1, DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-7-2

Requirements

Requirement	Level	Section	Tests
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-1`	Apply upstream verification to routes received from customers and lateral peers (Section 6)
	MUST	6	positive`unit/verifyTestASPAStateForPath` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: verifyASPA runs on every received UPDATE carrying an AS_PATH whenever ASPA is enabled (a superset that includes customer and peer routes), and there is no required case where such a route must NOT be verified (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/rpki.go:338)
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-2`	AS_SET in path must result in Unknown validation state (Section 6)
	MUST	6	positive`unit/verifyTestASPAStateForPath` positive`unit/verifyTestASPAVerifyASSet` negative`unit/verifyTestASPAVerifyValid`
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-3`	Prepend removal must only collapse consecutive duplicates (Section 6)
	MUST	6	positive`unit/verifyTestASPANormalizePrepends` negative`unit/verifyTestASPANormalizePrepends`
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-4`	Support per-AFI ASPA records if provided by cache (Section 6)
	MUST	6	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: the ASPA PDU AFI-flags byte is read only to reject unknown AFI and is then discarded; ASPARecord carries no AFI field and the cache is keyed by customer AS alone, so per-AFI records for one customer overwrite each other and one AS_PATH state is applied to both IPv4 and IPv6 NLRIs (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/aspa_cache.go:10-13, rpki.go:344)
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-x-1`	AS0 in ASPA provider set must be ignored (Pitfalls)
	MUST	x	positive`unit/verifyTestParseASPAPDUReservedProviderAS` negative`unit/verifyTestParseASPAPDU`
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-1`	Invalid routes must not be preferred over Valid or Unknown routes (Section 8)
	MUST NOT	8	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test {gap}: ASPA state drives only a binary reject/keep decision with no local-pref demotion or best-path tiebreak, and the default Invalid action is LogOnly (retain), so an accepted ASPA-Invalid route competes on ordinary BGP attributes and can outrank an ASPA-Valid route for the same prefix (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/rpki.go:92-100, rpki_config.go:110)
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-7-1`	Re-run verification when ASPA data changes (Section 7)
	MUST	7	positive`unit/verifyTestASPATrackerRevalidate` negative`unit/verifyTestASPATrackerRevalidateNoChange`
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-7-2`	Use the most recent ASPA data available (Section 7)
	MUST	7	positive`unit/verifyTestASPAApplyDeltaMostRecent` negative`no test`no negative test {single-polarity}: ApplyDelta atomically replaces cache entries at each End of Data and verifyASPA reads the live cache under lock, so verification always reflects the applied delta; there is no stale-data mode to test negatively (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/aspa_cache.go:110-129)
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-2`	Reject Invalid routes by default (Section 8)
	SHOULD	8	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-3`	Accept Unknown routes as unverified (Section 8)
	SHOULD	8	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-4`	Log Invalid results for operational visibility (Section 8)
	SHOULD	8	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-5`	Assign local-pref based on ASPA validation state (Section 8)
	MAY	8	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-5`	Skip verification for routes from upstream providers (Section 6)
	MAY	6	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-6`	Apply verification to IBGP-learned routes (Section 6)
	MAY	6	positive`no test`no positive test negative`no test`no negative test

Gaps and untested MUSTs

Requirement	State	Reason
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-6-4` Support per-AFI ASPA records if provided by cache (Section 6)	{gap}, no test	the ASPA PDU AFI-flags byte is read only to reject unknown AFI and is then discarded; ASPARecord carries no AFI field and the cache is keyed by customer AS alone, so per-AFI records for one customer overwrite each other and one AS_PATH state is applied to both IPv4 and IPv6 NLRIs (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/aspa_cache.go:10-13, rpki.go:344)
`DRAFT-IETF-SIDROPS-ASPA-VERIFICATION-8-1` Invalid routes must not be preferred over Valid or Unknown routes (Section 8)	{gap}, no test	ASPA state drives only a binary reject/keep decision with no local-pref demotion or best-path tiebreak, and the default Invalid action is LogOnly (retain), so an accepted ASPA-Invalid route competes on ordinary BGP attributes and can outrank an ASPA-Valid route for the same prefix (internal/component/bgp/plugins/rpki/rpki.go:92-100, rpki_config.go:110)

Proof state

A tagged unit reads unproven where no discrimination record exists for it: nothing in this tree has been observed to break it, so the claim its tag makes is unproven.